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THE EFFECT OF ENCROACHMENTS ON THE
MARKETABILITY OF LAND TITLES
Ross D. Netherton*
T IS A FAMILIAR maxim of real estate law that the purchaser
of land may not be required to accept a conveyance of the
premises unless the vendor offers a good and marketable title.'
The parties may, of course, specially agree among themselves
as to the title the purchaser will accept, but in the absence of any
stipulation in the contract of sale concerning the quality of the
title, the vendor's standard of performance is fixed by law.2 Be-
cause of this, the legal definition of goodness and marketability
of title is not only a fair question in connection with any dis-
cussion of the rights of vendor and purchaser, but it is a matter
which often assumes particular significance in the practical work-
ings of business and the law. Admittedly, any attempt to deal
comprehensively with the common law concept of marketability
of land titles is a large and difficult order; indeed, even a survey
limited to the questions arising in connection with encroachments
*A.B., M.A., J.D., Member Illinois bar; Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College
of Law.
1 Firebaugh v. Wittenberg, 309 Ill. 536, 141 N. E. 379 (1923). See also Walters
v. Mitchell, 6 Cal. App. 410, 92 P. 315 (1907) ; Justice v. Button, 89 Neb. 367, 131
N. W. 736 (1911) ; Becker v. Kelsey, 9 N. J. Misc. 1265, 157 A. 177 (1931) ; Blanck
v. Sadlier, 153 N. Y. 551, 47 N. E. 920 (1597).
2 The purchaser's right has also been described in terms of a "good title," a
"good or marketable title," a "good marketable title," a "good and merchantable
title," or a "good and sufficient title." See Maupin, Marketable Title to Real Estate
(Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York, 1921), 3d Ed., p. 20; 27 R. C. L., Vendor and
Purchaser, § 196; 55 Am. Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, § 149. But see note 13, post.
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often presents more than ordinary difficulties, for every phase
of the subject must be explained without the aid of absolute stand-
ards of reference for any except the most general conclusions. 3
Yet some agreement must be reached at the outset regarding the
concept of marketability or no progress in explaining this mat-
ter systematically will be possible.
I. THE RATIONALE OF TITLE MARKETABILITY
The purchaser's right to insist on a good and marketable
title is thought to exist independently of any provisions con-
tained in the contract of sale.4 It is usually described as one
of the "conditions" or "implications" of the sale,5 and has been
cited as an illustration of the workings of "natural justice,'' 6
or as an example of the intervention of law on behalf of persons
otherwise unable to adequately protect themselves. 7 From such
theoretical beginnings it is an easy step, and a natural one, to
say that the existence of any defect or fault in the vendor's title
excuses the purchaser from performance if he chooses to insist
upon the point. This, however, would never be practical for
use in the marketplace where perfectly flawless titles are a rarity.
Clearly, one can formulate a useful rationale of title marketability
only after one reconsiders with care the meaning and usage of
the terms "good title" and "marketable title."
3 Among the attempts to deal generally with the problem see Maupin, op. cit.,
North and VanBuren, Real Estate Titles and Conveyancing (Prentiss Hall, Inc.,
New York, 1927), and Jacobson, "Marketability of Land Titles," 2 N. J. L. Rev. 27
(1936).
4 MacChesney, Principles of Real Estate Law (The Macmillan Co., New York,
1927), p. 478; Maupin, op. cit., p. 20; 27 R. C. L., Vendor and Purchaser, § 196;
Refeld v. Woodfolk, 22 How. Pr. 318, 5 S. Ct. 318, 16 L. Ed. 370 (1850) ; Street v.
French, 147 Ill. 342, 35 N. E. 814 (1893) ; Townshend v. Goodfellow, 40 Minn. 312,
41 N. W. 1056 (1889) ; Blanck v. Sadlier, 153 N. Y. 551, 47 N. E. 920 (1897).
5 Heaton v. Nelson, 69 Colo. 320, 194 P. 614 (1920) ; Houser v. Vose, 33 Ga. App.
451, 126 S. E. 869 (1925).
6 Blanck v. Sadlier, 153 N. Y. 551, 47 N. E. 920 (1897) ; Summy v. Ramsey, 53
Wash. 93, 101 P. 506 (1909). Note also the theory that, since a purchase of land
is in effect a contract for the transfer of a legal title, the parties must necessarily
be presumed to contemplate a perfect title; 55 Am. Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, § 149.
7 Summy v. Ramsey, 53 Wash. 98, 101 P. 506 (1909).
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It is a common habit today to use the phrase "good and
marketable title" as if the terms were synonymous, that is as if
a 'good title" was a marketable title and a "marketable title"
referred to a good title." Yet, a second thought will show that
each of these terms, taken alone, has a distinct and different
meaning. "Goodness," when used to describe land titles, has al-
ways referred to perfection and absolute flawlessness, 9 whereas
"marketability" has been regarded as a standard of lesser per-
fection, referring to what a man of reasonable prudence, familiar
with the facts and cognizant of their legal significance, would
accept in the ordinary course of his business. 10 Under such defi-
nitions, it is possible to imagine situations in which a title may
have several technical defects and yet be acceptable to the rea-
sonable and prudent man,1 or to find cases where a title is per-
fect of record yet is open to suspicions that would defeat its
marketability. 12
This being so, it would seem improper to combine the terms
"good" and "marketable" in the same descriptive designation
5 Boylan v. Wilson, 202 Ala. 26, 79 So. 364 (1918); Smith v. Barghan, 156 Cal.
359, 104 P. 689 (1909) ; Kincaid v. Dobrinsky, 225 Ill. App. 85 (1922) ; Fagan v.
Hook, 134 Iowa 381, 105 N. W. 155 (1905) ; McGuire Bros. v. Blanchard, 107 Iowa
490, 78 N. W. 231 (1899) ; Shea v. Evans, 109 Md. 229, 72 A. 600 (1919) ; Barthel
v. Engle, 261 Mo. 307, 168 S. W. 1154 (1914); Ogg v. Herman, 71 Mont. 10, 227
P. 476 (1924) ; Genske v. Jensen, 188 Wis. 17, 205 N. W. 548 (1925).
9 Peckham v. Stewart, 97 Cal. 147, 31 P. 928 (1893); Warner v. Middlesex
Assurance Co., 21 Conn. 444 (1852) ; Roberts v. Bassett, 105 Mass. 409 (1870);
Wurfel v. Bockler, 106 Ore. 579, 210 P. 213 (1922).
10 Keneflck v. Shumaker, 64 Ind. App. 552, 116 N. E. 319 (1917) ; Smith v. Huber,
224 Iowa 817, 277 N. W. 557 (1938) ; Cappel v. Potts, 192 Iowa 661, 185 N. W. 148
(1921); Wiemann v. Steffan, 186 Mo. App. 584, 172 S. W. 472 (1915); Todd v.
Union Dime Savings Inst., 128 N. Y. 636, 28 N. E. 504 (1891) ; Sachs v. Owings,
121 Va. 162, 92 S. E. 997 (1917).
11 In Moore v. Elliott, 76 Wash. 520, at 521, 136 P. 849 (1913), the court stated
that to be marketable within the specific performance rule a "title need not be
free from every possible technical criticism, but must be such that a reasonably
well informed and intelligent purchaser in the exercise of ordinary business caution
would accept it." See also Cappel v. Potts, 192 Iowa 661, 185 N. W. 145 (1921),
and Thompson, Title to Real Property (Bobbs, Merrill & Co., Indianapolis, 1919),
pp. 95-9.
12 Block v. Ryan, 4 D. C. App. 283 (1894) ; Smith v. Huber, 224 Iowa 817, 277
N. W. 557 (1938) ; Rife v. Lybarger, 49 Ohio St. 422, 31 N. E. 768 (1892) ; Adkins
v. Gillespie, 189 S. W. 275 (Tex. Civ. App., 1916) ; Harrass v. Edwards, 94 Wis.
459, 69 N. W. 69 (1896).
109
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unless it can be first shown that, when taken in combination, they
lose their original mutually exclusive meanings and emerge as
something new in the language of the law. Actually, this is ex-
actly what has occurred. Present usage of the term "good and
marketable title" means something more than merely the sum
of two standards of performance considered disjunctively. By
gradual steps the courts have sketched in a new, composite stand-
ard of performance to which the vendor must measure. 13 Under
present usage, the term means more than a title which is valid
in law, or which could be made valid by litigation designed to
establish the point. Validity, in the opinion of the courts, is
not enough and will not be substituted for the opinion of the
reasonable and prudent man. 14  Generally, it is thought that a
reasonable and prudent man would require his title to be free
from encumbrances, liens, or outstanding interests of any sort ;15
free from material interferences with peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the land;16 free from the threat of vexatious liti-
gation; 17 and free from any circumstance or suspicion which
might jeopardize the subsequent mortgageability or saleability
to a reasonably prudent purchaser.' s A reasonable doubt con-
13 Gifford v. Burge, 5 F. (2d) 829 (1925) ; Agnew v. Nelson, 27 Cal. App. 39, 148
P. 819 (1915) ; Cappel v. Potts, 192 Iowa 661, 185 N. W. 148 (1921) ; Kling v. Greef
Realty Co., 166 Mo. App. 190, 148 S. W. 203 (1912) ; Kennedy v. Dennstadt, 31 N. D.
422, 154 N. W. 271 (1915).
14 Shonsey v. Clayton, 107 Neb. 695, 187 N. W. 113 (1922). For early beginnings,
see statements of the same rule in Heath v. Heath, 1 Bro. C. C. 147, 28 Eng. Rep.
1045 (1782) ; Rose v. Calland, 5 Ves. Jr. 186, 31 Eng. Rep. 537 (1800) ; and Stapylton
v. Scott, 16 Ves. Jr. 272, 33 Eng. Rep. 988 (1809).
15 Arnd v. Lerch, 162 Md. 318, 159 A. 587 (1932) ; DeVero v. Sparks. 189 Mo.
App. 500, 176 S. W. 1066 (1915) ; Kennedy v. Dennstadt, 31 N. D. 422, 154 N. W.
271 (1915) ; McLaughlin v. Wheeler, 1 S. D. 497, 47 N. W. 816 (1891).
16 Savage v. Shields, 293 F. 863 (1923) ; Holt v. Manuel, 186 Ark. 435, 54 S. W.
(2d) 66 (1932); McConnell v. Deal, 296 Mo. 275, 246 S. W. 594 (1922) ; Acme
Realty Co. v. Schinasi, 215 N. Y. 495, 109 N. E. 577 (1915) ; Vibroplex Co. v. J. May
Realty Co., 119 Misc. 734, 198 N. Y. S. 327 (1922).
17 Brelie v. Klafter, 342 Ill. 622, 174 N. E. 882 (1931) ; Cowan v. Epstein, 248 Ii.
App. 111 (1928) ; Bier v. Walbaum, 102 N. J. L. 368, 131 A. 888 (1926) ; Empire
Realty Co. v. Sayre, 107 App. Div. 415, 95 N. Y. S. 371 (1905) ; Herman v. Somers,
158 Pa. 424, 27 A. 1050 (1893).
18 Firebaugh v. Wittenberg, 309 Ill. 536, 141 N. E. 379 (1923); Kling v. Greef
Realty Co., 166 Mo. App. 190, 148 S. W. 203 (1912) ; McLaughlin v. Nelson, 113
Neb. 308, 202 N. W. 871 (1925); Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Williams, 63 S. W.
(2d) 570 (Tex. Civ. App., 1933); Flood v. Von Marcard, 102 Wash. 395, 172 P.
884 (1918).
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cerning any of these features will defeat marketability. 19 Sugden
once put the whole thing rather neatly when he wrote:
It hath become a settled and invariable rule, that a purchaser
shall not be compelled to accept a doubtful title . . . for
it would be an extraordinary proceeding for a court of
equity to compel a purchaser to take an estate which it can-
not warrant to him . . . [Therefore] to enable equity to
enforce specific performance against a purchaser, the title
ought, like Caesar's wife, to be free even from suspicion.2
Today, the term "free even from suspicion" may appear a
little strong, but without doubt the basic soundness of the rule
has remained unchanged.21
Sugden's remark suggests that the first tendencies to de-
part from the strictly logical construction of the phrase "good
and marketable title" appeared in courts of equity when handling
suits for specific performance. He discovered, on reading the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century English decisions,
that the chancellors often held titles to be unmarketable in spite
of their admitted perfection in technical matters, but he was
careful to note that "whether a court of law will act on this
19 Messer-Johnson Realty Co. v. Security Savings & Loan Co., 208 Ala. 541, 94
So. 734 (1921); Martens v. Berendsen, 213 Cal. 111, 1 P. (2d) 440 (1931) ; Weber-
pals v. Jenny, 300 Ill. 145, 133 N. E. 62 (1921) ; Pound v. Pleister, 106 N. J. Eq.
101, 150 A. 58 (1930) ; Irving v. Campbell, 121 N. Y. 535, 24 N. E. 821 (1890);
Schriver v. Schriver, 86 N. Y. 575 (1881).
20 Sugden, Vendors and Purchasers (E. & L. Merriam, Brookfield, Mass., 1836),
9th Ed., p. 410. In Romily v. James, 6 Taunt. 263 at 274, 128 Eng. Rep. 1035 at
1040 (1815), appears the statement that "it is said that the Plaintiff will have
made out his claim to recover back his deposit if a cloud is cast upon the title.
That is not so in a court of law; he must stand by the judgment of the court as
they find the title to be, whether good or bad; and, if it is good in the judgment of
a court of law, he cannot recover back his deposit. If he had gone into a court of
equity, it might have been otherwise. I know a court of equity often says, 'This
is a title which, though we think it available, Is not one which we will compell an
unwilling purchaser to take'; but that distinction is not known in a court of law."
21 Note, in this regard, the statement in Kling v. Greef Realty Co., 166 Mo. App.
190 at 196, 148 S. W. 203 at 205 (1912), to the effect that a "reasonable doubt of
title, as . . .will render it unmarketable in the contemplation of the law, does not
embrace mere shadows or possibilities, but probabilities." Jacobson, "Marketability
of Land Titles," 2 N. J. L. Rev. 27 (1936), says that marketability lies "somewhere
between complete freedom from all defects" and a "subjection to mere suspicions
ending only in suspicions."
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doctrine is doubtful."' 22  To a certain extent, this division was
carried over into the American decisions where courts of law
were not inclined to hear any equitable arguments either in
raising or dissolving objections to title.23  Today, however, it is
possible to see precedents in many courts of law which indicate
that the rule of equity has been adopted by the common law.2,
Anyone familiar with other fields of law, where the opinion
of the "reasonable and prudent man" is the general standard of
the courts, knows that it is far from being a self-applying prin-
ciple. Each new fact situation presents a new opportunity for
distinctions to be made. So, here, it is not enough to say that
the rationale of our present concept of title marketability is
based on the judgment of the reasonable and prudent man; some-
thing must be said about the factors and circumstances that in
times past have been looked upon as capable of persuading such
a man. It will not be unusual, in cases soon to be pointed out, that
an encroachment of a single inch may defeat marketability in
one case and not affect it in another, and both holdings will be
justified in the name of the reasonable man. One stops short
of explaining such decisions unless one finds out why such deci-
sions vary.
Of course, the first explanatory step the courts take is to
say that in one instance the encroachment is "substantial" or
"material" and in the other it is not.25  If pushed further, the
22 Sugden, op. cit., 412-3. He also noted that "when a man buys a commodity, he
expects to get a clear undisputed title, and not such a one as may be questionable,
at least In a court of law." This expression seems to refer to the question of
whether equitable objections to title are a defence at law. No one is obliged to buy
a lawsuit. But in Romily v. James, 6 Taunt. 274, 128 Eng. Rep. 1040 (1815), where
at law the same argument was urged on behalf of a purchaser, it was intimated
that if any doubt could be cast on the title of the vendor the plaintiff would be
entitled to recover back his deposit. The court noted that "if he had gone into a
court of equity, the Chancellor would not, perhaps, have obliged the unwilling pur-
chaser to ratify the contract." See also Roach v. Rutherford, 4 Des. (S. C. Eq.)
126 (1810).
23 Moore v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 22 N. E. 233 (1889) ; Bayliss v. Stimson, 53
N. Y. S. 225 (1888), affirmed in 110 N. Y. 621, 17 N. E. 144 (1888) ; O'Reilly v.
King, 25 N. Y. S. 587, 25 How. Pr. 408 (1865).
24 Eggers v. Busch, 154 Ill. 604, 39 N. E. 619 (1895) ; Parker v. Porter, 11 Ill.
App. 602 (1882); Williams v. Bricker, 83 Kan. 53, 109 P. 998 (1910); Metz v.
Wright, 116 Mo. App. 631, 92 S. W. 1125 (1906) ; Summy v. Ramsey, 53 Wash. 93,
101 P. 506 (1909).
25 Merges v. Ringler, 34 App. Div. 415, 54 N. Y. S. 280 (1898). See also Maupin,
op. cit., § 307a.
EFFECT OF ENCROACHMENTS
courts might admit that in many instances their concept of sub-
stantiality is shaped by balancing the equities of the parties in-
volved, or the competing interests of the community in regard
to the free alienability of land and the security of property rights,
or the influence of precedent. At best the pattern is hazy,26 and
much must be left to the discretion of the court. But this has
not meant that it is impossible to make predictions under our
present concept of marketability. In our society, it is not by
accident that land has long been a symbol of stability and the
courts seem to have consciously cultivated a consistency in their
attitude against the pressures for rapid movement in the law.
Speaking generally of encroachments as they affect marketa-
bility, the cases are divisible into three main types. One group
includes situations where the premises being sold are encroached
upon by structures belonging to adjoining landowners. A second
class includes cases where the premises being sold are improved
with buildings which encroach upon adjoining premises. The
third has to do with situations where the premises being sold
encroach upon public streets or highways, presenting problems
basically similar to those of the second class but complicated
by the special rights of the public at large. Encroachments fall-
ing within any one of these categories are seldom intentional;
they usually result from building without accurate survey or
from failure to follow a survey properly made. Intentional or
not, they present troublesome possibilities. If the theory of pri-
vate ownership of lands is carried to its logical conclusion, it
may require that such intrusions either be removed regardless of
cost or else must operate to render unmarketable to title to the
property in question.27
26Jacobson, "Marketability of Land Titles," 2 N. J. L. Rev. 27 at 31 (1936),
comments that "it is submitted that the pragmatic legal results in vendor and
purchaser cases over marketability of title [should] be expressed in terms of
hazards of litigation. This hazard . . . is what the reasonable purchaser really
aims to avoid. If there be any reasonable chance that some third person may
question the purchaser's ownership of the property, either by reason of defects in
the vendor's chain of title, some outstanding claim or some disputed question of
law or fact, the title should be deemed unmarketable."
27 Harrington v. McCarthy, 169 Mass. 492, 48 N. E. 278 (1897); Owenson v.
Bradley, 50 N. D. 741, 197 N. W. 885 (1924); Lewis v. Pingree National Bank,
47 Utah 35, 151 P. 558 (1915).
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II. ENCROACHMENTS UPON PREMISES BEING SOLD
The reasons for regarding a vendor's title unmarketable,
when the premises being sold are subject to an encroachment by
structures belonging to adjoining landowners, require no ex-
tended analysis. So long as the land is subject to the encroach-
ment, the purchaser cannot take possession and enjoy the full
amount of land he has contracted to pay for. Not only is the
right to immediate and complete possession hampered but the
purchaser may never be able to go into full possession of the
portion of his land encroached upon without first going to the
trouble and expense of litigation to establish his right thereto.
These rights, of course, are part of an ancient heritage be-
longing to all purchasers which Blackstone, in his day, regarded
as unquestioned. "Cuius est solum," he wrote, "eius est usque
ad caeleum . . , [This] is the maxim of the law; upwards, there-
fore, no man may erect any building, or the like, to overhang
another's land: and downwards, whatever is in a direct line be-
tween the surface of any land and the center of the earth be-
longs to the owner of the surface." ' 2 To this argument there
has, in more recent times, been added another, to-wit: that un-
der such circumstances marketability is lost because even though
the encroachment does not interrupt the normal use of the land,
the purchaser always runs the risk that, in a subsequent attempt
to sell or mortgage the land, the market value of the property
would be decreased.
Supported by these propositions, the courts have held that
where a substantial encroachment exists upon the premises be-
ing sold the vendor's title is unmarketable. 29 As indicated pre-
viously, the standard for judging the substantiality of encroach-
ments is often a balance of many factors. Actions at law to
28 Bl. Comm., Book II, Ch. 2, p. 18. But see comment on Boehringer v. Montalto.
254 N. Y. S. 276 (1932), in 11 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 107.
29 Harder v. Lang Realty Co., 61 Cal. App. 394. 214 P. 1017 (1923) ; Jawitz v.
Caldwell Investment Co., 103 N. J. Eq. 61, 142 A. 181 (1928) ; Fineman v. Callahan,
222 App. Div. 752, 225 N. Y. S. 401 (1927) ; Kaplan v. Bergman, 122 App. Div. 876,
107 N. Y. S. 423 (1907) ; Elinsky v. Berger, 87 App. Div. 584, 84 N. Y. S. 483 (1903);
Ziebarth v. Manion, 161 Wash. 201, 296 P. 561 (1931).
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recover deposits or damages have been fairly consistent in per-
mitting relaxation of the rule only in situations that could be
defended by the doctrine of de minimis.30 Courts of equity, with
freedom to consider many factors that courts of law could not,
have regularly recognized other grounds for mitigating the
strictness of the general rule.3 1 In Merges v. Ringler, 32 one
of the few decisions attempting a systematic explanation of
the subject, the court mentions two grounds for holding that an
encroachment upon the premises being sold might be disregarded.
First, it was said, the extent of the encroachment might be in-
significant when compared to the total area of land being sold;
and second, the uncertainty of methods of measurement neces-
sarily involved in dealing with encroachments of a fraction of an
inch might be reason for disregarding an objection based upon
such measurements. In other cases, the fact that the encroach-
ing portions of the offending structure were easily removable at
very slight cost, or, if allowed to remain would not interfere with
the normal use of the property, were held to justify upholding
marketability of title in spite of the encroachment.3 3  On the
other hand, both law and equity decisions seem to agree that
marketability is lost when the normal or contemplated use of
the premises is impaired by the existence of the encroachment ;34
30 Walters v. Mitchell; 6 Cal. App. 410, 92 P. 315 (1907), action by purchaser to
recover deposit; Vogt v. Shumate, 213 Ky. 503, 281 S. W. 514 (1926), action for
damages against purchaser for refusal to accept title; Place v. Dudley, 41 App. Div.
540, 58 N. Y. S. 671 (1899), action by purchaser for breach of contract and for re-
covery of earnest money. But see Geffin v. Schneider, 105 N. Y. S. 1035 (1906),
where, in action to recover down payment, it was held that the vendor's title was
not unmarketable in spite of encroachments on the premises being sold.
31 See, for example, Sauter v. Frank, 67 Misc. 657, 124 N. Y. S. 802 (1910), a suit
for specific performance in spite of a four-inch encroachment by a wall belonging
to the adjoining premises, and Ungrich v. Shaff, 119 App. Div. 843, 105 N. Y. S.
1013 (1907), where vendor was held entitled to specific performance even though
the foundation of the adjoining premises projected two inches over the lot line
below the surface and, in another place, the neighbor's wall encroached five inches.
32 34 App. Div. 415, 54 N. Y. S. 280 (1898).
33 Ungrich v. Shaff, 119 App. Div. 843, 105 N. Y. S. 1013 (1907), where encroach-
ment consisted of loose stones placed to retain mound of dirt piled on the adjoining
premises; Geffin v. Schneider, 105 N. Y. S. 1035 (1906), involving an encroachment
by "binder stones" in the foundation of the building on the adjoining premises;
Celestial Realty Co. v. Childs, 182 App. Div. 85, 169 N. Y. S. 597 (1917), an en-
croachment by show windows removable without damage to the adjoining property.
34 See cases cited in note 29, ante.
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when the purchaser's prospects of future sale are jeopardized; a5
or when the threat of future litigation because of the defect is
apparent.-"
Ordinarily, the legal effect of an encroachment is to be de-
termined at the time when the vendor tenders title. That view
would seem to be in harmony with a rationale of marketability
which emphasizes actual injury rather than a mere suspicion as
the basis for a defect. Occasionally, however, a case appears in
which marketability is defeated merely because of the possibility
of an encroachment at some future time. So, for example, where
a private dedication of land for street purposes cut across the
premises being sold, it was held that the filing of the plat of
dedication operated to create an encroachment just as surely as
would the commencement of excavation for street purposes.37
What has been said should be remembered as applying
only to cases where the parties have specified nothing in their
contract of sale concerning the quality of the title to be con-
veyed. Should the contract contain an express covenant against
encroachments, or possess terms otherwise specifying the physical
condition of the premises, the courts are noticeably stricter in
their insistence upon freedom from encroachments.3" A New
Jersey case, that of Herring v. Esposito,"9 will serve as a typical
illustration. The contract there provided, among other things,
that the parties "agreed and understood that the buildings upon
said premises are all within the boundary lines of the property
described in the deed therefor, and that there are no encroach-
35 Pasternack v. Alter, 95 N. J. Eq. 377, 123 A. 885 (1924).
36 Van Riper v. Wickersham, 77 N. J. Eq. 232, 76 A. 1020 (1910); Kaplan v.
Bergman, 122 App. Div. 876, 107 N. Y. S. 423 (1907) ; Klim v. Sachs, 102 App. Div.
44, 92 N. Y. S. 107 (1905) ; Elinsky v. Berger, 87 App. Div. 584, 84N. Y. S. 483 (1903).
37 Simpson v. Kiipsteln, 89 N. J. Eq. 543, 105 A. 218 (1918). But query here
whether the decision could not have been equally well supported by claiming that
the dedication created an easement in favor of the public, which was a defect in
the title.
38 Kohoot v. Gurbisz, 101 N. J. Eq. 757, 139 A. 223 (1927) ; Wyatt v. Bergan, 98
N. J. Eq. 502, 130 A. 595 (1925); Vogt v. Shumate, 213 Ky. 503, 281 S. W. 514
(1926) ; Fineman v. Callahan, 222 App. Div. 752, 225 N. Y. S. 401 (1927) ; Reynolds
v. Wynne, 121 App. Div. 272, 105 N. Y. S. 849 (1907).
39 94 N. J. Eq. 348, 119 A. 765 (1922).
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ments thereon." In refusing to uphold the claim that marketa-
bility was unaffected by an encroachment of a few inches, the
court declared that specific performance had to be refused, al-
though the encroachment was not sufficient to have prevented
specific performance of the contract if under the usual covenants,
"because to disregard the stipulations would be to draw a new
contract for the parties on which their minds had not met." 40 This
same respect for the intent of the parties, however, has been held
conducive to an opposite result where the premises are described
in "more-or-less" terms."'
III. ENCROACHMENTS UPON ADJOINING PREMISES
In the case of encroachment by the vendor's buildings upon
the premises adjoining, the general rule stands the same as in the
case of encroachment upon the premises being sold, to-wit: where
a substantial encroachment exists, the vendor's title may be re-
jected as unmarketable.4 2 Again, as with other types of encroach-
ments, the courts tend toward a stricter application of the prin-
ciple in actions at law than would be the case in equity.4 3 The
rationale of the courts, however, is somewhat different for the
purchaser cannot claim that he is actually getting less than he
should as the vendor's conveyance undertakes to pass all and
more than the description requires. Rather, the trouble is that
the vendor's attempt to thus convey more than he actually owns
may involve the purchaser in expensive and vexatious litigation
over his right to maintain his buildings in the encroaching posi-
tion. If unsuccessful in the defense of his rights, the purchaser
40 94 N. J. Eq. 348 at 350, 119 A. 765 at 766.
41 See Weintraub v. Seigel, 133 App. Div. 677, 118 N. Y. S. 261 (1909).
42 In general, see Maupin, op. cit., pp. 868-9; Kratovil, Real Estate Law (Prentice-
Hall, Inc., New York, 1946), p. 84; North and VanBuren, Real Estate Titles and
Conveyancing (Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1929), pp. 100-1; 55 Am. Jur., Vendor
and Purchaser, § 254.
43 Compare Jacobs v. Freyham, 156 La. 585, 100 So. 726 (1924), an action to
recover a deposit and the costs of survey, and Gruhn v. Eppig, 175 App. Div. 787,
161 N. Y. S. 629 (1916), an action for damages, with Security B. & M. Co. v. Weiss,
100 N. J. Eq. 156, 135 A. 329 (1926), Hennig v. Smith, 151 N. Y. S. 444 (1915), and
Meadows v. Mitchell, 135 App. Div. 213, 120 N. Y. S. 319 (1909), suits for specific
performance.
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may be put to the expense of removing the encroachment or be
forced to depend upon a servitude in his neighbor's land for the
right to maintain the buildings. At the very least, the purchaser
would be forced to maintain himself always prepared to show
that his predecessors in title had undisputed occupation of the
area encroached upon in a manner and for a time sufficient to es-
tablish a right by adverse possession.
These considerations, naturally, have affected the applica-
tion of the rule. The main question is still whether or not the
offending encroachment is a substantial one, but a new factor ap-
pears to be influential in determining substantiality. In the last
analysis, the inquiry is as to the likelihood of there being any
molestation of the buildings on the land as they stand at the time
of conveyance.4 4 The result is invariably a delicate balance based
on a consideration of the character of the encroaching structure,
the purpose to which it is put, and the estimated expense of
removing the encroaching portions. The exact extent of the
encroachment and whether or not it actually injures the adjoin-
ing premises do not seem to be factors of any great import.4 5
In practice, it has meant that the courts have been inclined
to disregard objections based on encroachments by old or dilapi-
dated buildings,4 6 by temporary structures of small value,4 7 or
by structures which, regardless of type, are removable at only
slight effort or expense.4 s On the other hand, a fatal defect has
been found where the encroachment is by a permanent structure,4 9
44 Hennig v. Smith, 151 N. Y. S. 444 (1915) ; Merges v. Ringler, 34 App. Div. 415,
54! N. Y. S. 280 (1898) ; McDonald v. Bach, 29 Misc. 96, 60 N. Y. S. 557 (1899).
45 Traxler v. McLeran, 116 Cal. App. 226, 2 P. (2d) 553 (1931) ; Snow v. Monk,
81 App. Div. 206, 80 N. Y. S. 719 (1903) ; Katz v. Kaiser, 10 App. Div. 137, 41
N. Y. S. 776 (1896) ; Keitel v. Zimmerman, 19 Misc. 581, 43 N. Y. S. 676 (1897).
46 See Scheinman v. Bloch, 97 N. J. L. 404, 117 A. 389 (1922), holding a four-inch
encroachment by a dilapidated frame shed not to be substantial, and Weil v. Radley,
31 App. Div. 25, 52 N. Y. S. 398 (1898), treating an old, partly wrecked building,
which encroached two inches, as not being a defect which justified rejection of title.
47 Merges v. Ringler, 34 App. Div. 415, 54 N. Y. S. 280 (1898).
48 In Well v. Radley, 31 App. Div. 25, 52 N. Y. S. 398 (1898), the evidence showed
that, prior to any future occupancy of the premises, it would be necessary to re-
move and reconstruct the building. The court therefore found that "if any encroach-
ment existed, it could then be remedied, and easily, and without expense be made
to conform to the boundaries stated in the deed."
49 Stevenson v. Fox, 40 App. Div. 354, 57 N. Y. S. 1094 (1899).
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or one with respect to which the cost of removal would be con-
siderable50 The rule of de minimis, cautiously applied only to
encroachments of a clearly negligible extent and rarely used alone
to justify disregarding an encroachment, has been mentioned
fairly often in combination with other mitigating circumstances.6 1
Just as no mathematical formula is possible for determining
when to apply the rule of de minimis, so there is no definite list
of factors which, when taken in combination therewith, will be
sufficient to persuade any given court to disregard the objection
of an encroachment. In the search for predictability in this field,
one is driven back upon the general requirement that the facts
should show "no practical danger" that the purchaser would be
unable to enjoy the property as it stood at the time of convey-
ance.
52
Inevitably, the analysis of what constitutes a "substantial"
encroachment brings up the question of how much significance
is to be attached to a long-continued sufferance on the part of
the owner whose premises are being encroached without any move
to challenge the right to maintain the encroaching structures.
The question may take form in either of two arguments. On the
one hand, the vendor may claim that he has perfected a legally
recognized right to maintain his buildings in their encroaching
position by means of adverse possession, estoppel or statutory
easement.58 Here the vendor's argument supposes that he has
acquired a right in the land of his neighbor which can be passed
on to a subsequent purchaser, protecting the latter by completely
extinguishing any right to challenge the maintenance of the build-
ings as they stand. In its other form, the argument does not claim
that no further right of action against the encroachment exists
50 Merges v. Ringler, 34 App. Div. 415, 54 N. Y. S. 280 (1898).
51 Mertens v. Berendsen, 213 Cal. 111, 1 P. (2d) 440 (1931) ; Scheinman v. Bloch,
97 N. J. L. 404, 117 A. 389 (1922) ; Katz v. Kaiser, 10 App. Div. 137, 41 N. Y. S.
776 (1896) ; Betzsch v. Mayer, 115 Misc. 422, 189 N. Y. S. 695 (1921).
52 Wilhelm v. Federgreen, 2 App. Div. 483, 38 N. Y. S. 8 (1896) ; McDonald v.
Bach, 29 Misc. 96, 60 N. Y. S. 557 (1899).
53 Schaefer v. Blumenthal, 169 N. Y. 221, 62 N. E. 175 (1901) ; Harrison v. Platt,
35 App. Div. 533, 54 N. Y. S. 842 (1898) ; Whitman v. Home Guardian Co., 135
Misc. 598, 238 N. Y. S. 301 (1929).
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but rather that it has been demonstrated that there is no likeli-
hood that there will be any action challenging the encroachment,
which fact would persuade a man of reasonable business prudence
to complete the purchase.
Typically, the latter argument runs along the line that evi-
dence of long unchallenged continuance should serve to rebut the
presumption upon which the purchaser must rest his right to re-
ject the title. Unless, therefore, it can be shown that there is
pending some litigation which challenges the right to maintain the
encroachment, the same ought not be deemed "substantial." Such
reasoning has, in times past, impressed the courts, both in ac-
tions to recover money paid and in suits for specific perform-
ance.5 4 Facts of that character are said to show not only a dis-
inclination on the part of the injured owner to bring legal ac-
tion challenging the encroachment, but even more, that if chal-
lenge were made, the injured owner would permit the correction
of the matter at a time and in a manner most convenient to the
owner whose structures cause the encroachment.5
This last point, and what has gone before concerning en-
croachments upon adjoining premises, must, of course, be remem-
bered with the same general reservation made in connection with
similar rules pertaining to encroachments on the premises being
sold, that is the exceptions will be applied solely in situations
where the contract of sale contains no special stipulation con-
cerning the character of the vendor's title. A contract stipulat-
ing that the vendor shall convey "free from encumberances and
encroachments," or one which contains a description of the prem-
ises by metes and bounds, does not admit of compromise with
the maxim of the law in the manner just described. Even though
clearly established easements and servitudes be shown, the exist-
ence of encroachments will defeat marketability under such con-
tracts.5 6
54 Katz v. Kaiser, 10 App. Div. 137, 41 N. Y. S. 776 (1896) ; McDonald v. Bach,
29 Misc. 96, 60 N. Y. S. 557 (1899).
55 Van Horn v. Stuyvesant, 50 Misc. 432, 100 N. Y. S. 547 (1906).
56 Jacobs v. Freyham, 156 La. 585, 100 So. 726 (1924); Richman v. Camorsil
Realty Co., 120 Misc. 648, 200 N. Y. S. 166 (1923) ; Hennig v. Smith, 151 N. Y. S.
444 (1915).
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IV. ENCROACHMENTS UPON STREETS AND HIGHWAYS
Special problems arise where structures belonging to the
premises being sold encroach upon public streets and highways.
In the general setting, of course, this topic is treated like any
other encroachment upon adjoining premises. The fundamental
rationale of the cases is to be found in the same desire to pro-
tect the purchaser in his right to maintain the structures in the
same position as when he agreed to buy them, hence the rule is
still that "substantial" encroachments will defeat marketability
but "trivial" ones will not. It is in connection with classifying
the factors and circumstances that minimize an encroachment
into triviality, however, that the special problems occur.
Because encroachments upon streets and highways are en-
croachments on the right of the sovereign, their implications are
more serious than when only private persons are involved. For
example, no vendor may argue that, through long unchallenged
use, he has acquired rights against the state or city by adverse
possession which may be passed to the purchaser as his guar-
antee that his rights will never be challenged. 57 Nor will the
law allow a state or a municipality to commit itself, in matters
affecting the public interest, as by acquiescence or permissive
ordinance operating to provide an estoppel for the future. 58 It
is generally agreed that the paramount right of the public in the
unobstructed use of streets and highways is not a matter which
will admit of compromise or bargaining.59
57 First National Bank v. Tyson, 133 Ala. 459, 32 So. 144 (1902); People v.
Harris, 203 Ill. 272, 67 N. E. 785 (1903) ; In re City of New York, 217 N. Y. 1, 111
N. E. 256 (1916) ; Acme Realty Co. v. Schinasi, 215 N. Y. 495, 109 N. E. 577 (1915) ;
City of New York v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 91 N. E. 283 (1910) ; Leo Levy Corp. v.
Dick, 116 Misc. 145, 190 N. Y. S. 238 (1921).
58 Chicago Cold Storage Co. v. People, 224 Ill. 287, 79 N. E. 692 (1906) ; John
Amsfield Co. v. Edward Grossman Co., 98 Ill. App. 180 (1901) ; Whittier Estates v.
Manhattan Savings Bank, 118 Misc. 662, 48 N. Y. S. (2d) 111 (1944) ; Leo Levy
Corp. v. Dick, 116 Misc. 145, 190 N. Y. S. 238 (1921).
59 Storck v. Baltimore, 101 Md. 476, 61 A. 330 (1905); State v. Jersey City, 52
N. J. L. 65, 18 A. 586 (1889) ; Gellman v. Hermann, 118 Misc. 290, 193 N. Y. S. 174
(1922). But apparently there are certain circumstances by which the courts will
recognize that such powers do exist in spite of the general principle: Leavenworth
v. Douglass, 59 Kan. 416, 53 P. 123 (1898) ; Fralinger v. Cooke, 108 Md. 682, 71 A.
529 (1908) ; Garrett v. James, 65 Md. 260, 3 A. 597 (1886) ; Sauter v. Utica City
National Bank, 119 App. Div. 898, 104 N. Y. S. 1139 (1908), affirmed in 193 N. Y.
661, 87 N. E. 1126 (1908).
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The position of a vendor whose premises encroach upon a
street or highway is, in this way, at a distinct disadvantage when
compared with his position as to an encroachment which does
not involve the public. Being unable ever to completely bar a
reassertion of the right of the public to have the offending struc-
ture removed, he must, if he is to prevail, convince the court that
a reasonable man would readily accept the title notwithstanding
the defect. The problem is one of balancing risks and costs. He
may prevail, and save the marketability of his title, by showing
that the cost of removal is slight even though the risk of being
challenged is high, the matter then being regarded as insignifi-
cant. Or, the element of cost being assumed to be constant, the
risk may be made variable so that he would still be entitled to
prevail if he could show that the risk of being challenged was a
trifling one.
Where the cost of removal is the variable factor, the points
of main concern will naturally be the extent of the effort and the
amount of the expense which will be involved. ° As a general
test, it has been said that the rule of de minimis marks the line
separating trivial from significant infringements.61 When the
cost of removal is such as may be absolved within the rule, the
vendor's title will be upheld; when the cost cannot be dismissed
in this way, the encroachment has been held to be substantial re-
gardless of the extent of the area of the street that is encroached
upon or whether the offending structure serves a functional or an
ornamental purpose.-2
Where risk of challenge is the variable factor, several pos-
sible tests have been proposed. One attempt at generalizing the
entire element of risk puts the basis of distinction at whether the
encroachment has resulted in any practical interference with the
60 Levy v. Hill, 70 App. Div. 95, 75 N. Y. S. 19 (1902) ; Gellman v. Hermann, 118
Misc. 290, 193 N. Y. S. 174 (1922) ; Hough v. Baldwin, 50 Misc. 546, 99 N. Y. S.
545 (1906).
61 Perlman v. Stellwagen, 115 Misc. 6, 187 N. Y. S. 845 (1921).
62 Leerburger v. Watson, 75 Misc. 3, 134 N. Y. S. 818 (1911) ; Van Horn v.
Stuyvesant, 50 Misc. 432, 100 N. Y. S. 547 (1906).
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use of the streets.' 3 More satisfying for purpose of long-run pre-
diction, however, are the decisions that depend on the various
positive manifestations of local public policy as being favorable
to the vendor's claim. When depending upon positive assurances
of this sort, the vendor would seem at his strongest when he is
able to show official acts or ordinances recognizing and permit-
ting the encroachment. These may deal with encroachments of a
particular class generally, or with the vendor's case in particu-
lar.6 4 In such cases, even though the courts assert that munici-
palities have no power to compromise public rights or to com-
mit the public to any future policy, it is clear that the public
acts do have a certain probative value. 5  So, in Ebert v. Hanne-
man,6 6 a case arising in New York over the matter of a bay win-
dow which encroached upon a street, the combination of fifteen
years of undisturbed existence and a recently issued permit from
the municipal authorities was regarded as sufficient to uphold
marketability. Even without the factor of a special permit, the
showing of a friendly public policy may be persuasive. The
63 Empire Realty Corp. v. Sayre, 107 App. Div. 415, 95 N. Y. S. 371 (1905).
64 See, for example, Harrington Co. v. Kadrey, 105 N. J. Eq. 389, 148 A. 3 (1929)
Gellman v. Hermann, 118 Misc. 290, 193 N. Y. S. 174 (1922).
65 In Gellman v. Hermann, 118 Misc. 290 at 291, 193 N. Y. S. 174 at 175 (1922),
the court said: "Of course, the municipality has not power to grant an exclusive
privilege of a permanent encroachment upon the highway. An order granting such
a privilege would be void. Such an ordinance does, however, indicate the policy
of the municipality . . . to permit . . . encroachmentfs] of . . . trivial nature . . .
and . . . courts have held uniformly that such encroachments do not make the title
to the building unmarketable . . . But, with the change of the municipal policy . . .
the courts have held that if the building encroaches on the public street to such an
extent as to threaten the vendee with a substantial loss of fee or rental value, or
a burdensome expense of altering the building, it cannot be said that the vendor
has a marketable title. When the attitude of the municipality has been unknown,
their existence has been held to make title unmarketable, when they are of a
substantial nature and the cost of removal would be burdensome." In Scheinman v.
Bloch, 97 N. J. L. 404 at 406, 117 A. 389 at 390 (1922), the court said: "Primarily
such encroachments on the street are nuisances at common law. But where, under
statutory authority . . . they are licensed and authorized by the municipality,
which represents the public, they necessarily become lawful structures, and so
remain so long as the municipal license is legally in force." Italics added. The
case of 556-558 Fifth Ave. Co. v. Lotus Club, 129 App. Div. 339, 113 N. Y. S. 886
(1908), indicates that where the legislature has deprived the city of the right to
institute action against an encroachment such right "to cause the encroachment to
be removed has at least been suspended indefinitely." Accord: Moser v. Cochrane,
107 N. Y. 35, 13 N. E. 442 (1887) ; Ungrich v. Shaff, 119 App. Div. 843, 105 N. Y. S.
1013 (1907) ; Broadbelt v. Loew, 15 App. Div. 343, 44 N. Y. S. 159 (1897) ; Celestial
Realty Co. v. Childs, 100 Misc. 532, 166 N. Y. S. 921 (1917).
66 69 Misc. 223, 125 N. Y. S. 237 (1910).
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case of Levy v. Hill,67 another New York case, may be regarded
as typical. There the question was whether the encroachment
of a stoop some fifteen feet onto the sidewalk operated to render
the vendor's title unmarketable, but was held not to have that
effect. The stoop had occupied its position for some thirty years
without objection either on the part of the municipality or from
adjoining property owners. The contingency that its removal
would ever be compelled by any person having authority was
deemed to be so remote as not to be within reasonable contem-
plation.68 On the other hand, where municipal policy is known
to require removal of street obstructions, or else leaves the mat-
ter in doubt, evidence of long-continued acquiescence is insuffi-
cient to make a balance in favor of the vendor.6 9
The intention of the parties, evidenced by their contract of
sale, is again given the same controlling weight in cases of en-
croachments upon streets as with other types of encroachments.
Where it is stipulated that the buildings upon the vendor's prem-
ises must all be within the lot lines, the courts stiffen their stand-
ards noticeably,70 so it is only where the parties agree to a de-
67 70 App. Div. 95, 75 N. Y. S. 19 (1902).
68 See also Mertens v. Berendsen, 213 Cal. 111, 1 P. (2d) 440 (1931) ; Traxier v.
McLeran, 116 Cal. App. 226, 2 P. (2d) 553 (1931); Waterman v. Taub, 3 N. J.
Misc. 216, 127 A. 676 (1925) ; Empire Realty Co. v. Sayre, 107 App. Div. 415, 95
N. Y. S. 371 (1905) ; Katz v. Kaiser, 10 App. Div. 137, 41 N. Y. S. 776 (1896) ; Van
Horn v. Stuyvesant, 50 Misc. 432, 100 N. Y. S. 547 (1906) ; Sasserath v. Metzger,
30 Abb. N. C. 407, 27 N. Y. S. 959 (1893).
69 Acme Realty Co. v. Schinasi, 215 N. Y. 495, 109 N. E. 577 (1915) ; City of New
York v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 91 N. E. 283 (1910) ; Ackerman v. True, 175 N. Y. 353,
67 N. E. 629 (1903) ; Gellman v. Hermann, 118 Misc. 290, 193 N. Y. S. 174 (1922) ;
Klimas v. Brumbach, 116 Misc. 299, 190 N. Y. S. 307 (1921). In the Acme case,
215 N. Y. 495 at 504, 109 N. E. 577 at 579, the court distinguished its prior position
by pointing out that, from time almost immemorial, it has been "the municipal
policy to acquiesce in the practically universal custom of encroaching upon the
streets with various building projections. This policy had its genesis in the infancy
of the city and it has been continued without interruption . . . The growing density
of the population and the spread of business . . . have created many perplexing
problems . . . It is familiar history that those changed conditions have led to the
compulsory removal of building encroachments from areas . . . where they had
always before been permitted . . . the change has become an established fact and
its binding force has been recognized in the later judicial decisions . . . In these
circumstances it cannot be said that the vendor has a marketable title if his build-
ing encroaches upon the public street to such an extent as to threaten the vendee
with a substantial loss . . . in altering the building to meet the requirements of
the law."
70 White Way Corp. v. Heinle, 103 N. J. Eq. 184, 142 A. 667 (1928), and Goldstein
v. Ehrlick, 96 N. J. Eq. 52, 121 A. 761 (1924), involved contracts specifying that
buildings be within lot lines. Thrice v. Kayton, 84 Va. 217, 4 S. E. 377 (1887),
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scription which would allow for an encroachment or accept one
which speaks in approximate terms that the encroachment may be
overlooked.7 1
V. CURES FOR DEFECTS DUE TO ENCROACHMENTS
The right to assert an objection based upon an encroachment
depends on the existence of the encroachment at the moment when
the vendor becomes bound to perform his part of the contract.
At any time prior to that moment, the vendor may, if he can,
remedy the objectionable defect and thereby deprive the pur-
chaser of any grounds for refusing to accept conveyance of title.
A study of the effect of encroachments on marketability of title
should, therefore, include some word about the means by which
admitted encroachments may be rendered harmless as objections
to title.
One obvious cure lies in the physical removal of the encroach-
ment and a restoration of the premises to their original or proper
condition. This may be possible at the pleasure of the vendor
when he controls the building which constitutes the encroach-
ment, but will rarely be possible without resort to litigation in
cases where the encroaching structure is owned by the adjoin-
ing landowner. While it is certain that the vendor has a right to
seek an injunction to force removal of an encroachment upon
his land, and while it is certain that such action would be a means
of curing the objection to title, this method has a serious limita-
tion in that it can be utilized only where the encroachment causes
irreparable damage. 72 Courts still could not issue injunctions in
dealt with a contract calling for a deed to premises described by metes and bounds.
See also Morra v. Laurel Realty Co., 100 N. J. L. 125, 125 A. 8 (1924) ; Jennings v.
Bauman, 214 App. Div. 361, 212 N. Y. S. 334' (1925); Heyman v. Streich, 134 App.
Div. 176, 114 N. Y. S. 603 (1908) ; Klimas v. Brumbach, 116 Misc. 299, 190 N. Y. S.
307 (1921).
71 In Steckler v. Godillot, 17 Misc. 286, 40 N. Y. S. 364 (1896), the contract
allowed for a variance of one inch from the record dimensions. See also Sheil v.
Samaroyan Realty Corp., 223 App. Div. 820, 228 N. Y. S. 425 (1928).
72 Norwalk Heating & Lighting Co. v. Vernam, 75 Conn. 662, 55 A. 168 (1903);
Pradelt v. Lewis, 297 Ill. 374, 130 N. E. 785 (1921) ; Turner v. Shriver, 269 Ill. 164,
109 N. E. 708 (1915) ; Antillia Protective Ass'n v. Wolfsohn, 244 Ill. App. 71 (1927);
Harrington v. McCarthy, 169 Mass. 492, 48 N. E. 278 (1897).
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that class of cases where the damage may be serious enough to
impair marketability if the impairment may be compensated for
by money damages.
Equally unsuccessft is the argument of the vendor who
obtains personal assurance from the owner of the encroachment
upon the vendor's land that he will remove it.7  Here the courts
have understandably felt that the purchaser should not be forced
to rely upon the assurance of one who is in no way a party to
the purchase contract nor to the pending litigation and thereby
assume the risk of later becoming involved in a controversy over
the matter. Nor is such weakness cured by reducing the agree-
ment between the vendor and the adjoining landowner to writing.
One popular device has been for a vendor to attempt to cure
an encroachment by concluding a party-wall agreement as to
the invading structure. But here, just as with the oral assur-
ance, the courts have held the vendor's action insufficient to cure
his defective title. Unless the purchaser, with notice of all the
facts, consents to such an agreement, the courts have not felt
that the purchaser should thus be forced to compromise his right
to complete independence in the use of the land.74
Where the encroachment in question is one by the vendor's
building against the adjoining premises, adverse possession is
almost invariably suggested as the cure for the objection. In
theory, such a possibility is always present but, from the
practical standpoint, there are several difficulties. The vendor
must always be sure that his possession has actually been
adverse, for it is a familiar proposition that mere pos-
session and exercise of dominion over premises the record
title to which is in a stranger does not necessarily import hos-
73 Ziebarth v. Manion, 161 Wash. 201, 296 P. 561 (1931).
74 Richman v. Camorsil Realty Co., 120 Misc. 648, 200 N. Y. S. 166 (1923). Where,
however, the vendor's negotiations are based on a prior agreement with the pur-
chaser and the contract of sale describes the premises in question in terms of the
party wall, such party wall agreement has been held to cure objection to market-
ability due to encroachment of the original wall on vendor's premises: Levy v. Hill,
50 App. Div. 294, 63 N. Y. S. 1002 (1900).
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tility to such record title holder.75  In addition, the vendor must
take care that during the period of his possession no circum-
stances have arisen which could prevent that possession from
ripening into the title that he seeks. Illustration of a failure
due to both the causes just mentioned is provided by the case of
Spero v. Schultz. 76 There the vendor sought specific performance
of his contract of sale despite an encroachment by his own wall
upon the premises adjoining because, he claimed, an unchallenged
adverse possession of thirty years had ripened into an easement
to maintain the wall. The argument was denied, however, when
the court said:
Upon the question of the time the wall has been used, the
evidence is satisfactory. But the added evidence of the ab-
sence of circumstances . . . which may have prevented the
use of the wall from ripening into title is wanting. For all
that appears there may or may not have been parties in be-
ing against whom the statute of limitations could have run,
but we do not understand that in the absence of proof a
presumption will arise or be indulged in that such was or
was not the fact, or that an agreement had ever been made
between the owners of the buildings in question permitting
the use of the wall as claimed. . . . The burden was upon
the vendor to show the title to such use of the wall. 77
Other pitfalls could be cited,78 but enough has been said, in point-
ing out the most frequent causes of failure, to put an examiner
75 Schriver v. Schriver, 86 N. Y. 575 (1881) ; Spero v. Schultz, 14 App. Div. 423,
43 N. Y. S. 1016 (1897); Wilhelm v. Federgreen, 2 App. Div. 483, 38 N. Y. S. 8
(1896).
76 14 App. Div. 423, 43 N. Y. S. 1016 (1897).
77 14 App. Div. 423 at 426, 43 N. Y. S. 1016 at 1018. Justice Ingraham dissented,
but on the sufficiency of the evidence rather than the principles concerning the test
of marketability. As to the latter, he said: "we have lately examined the question
of the nature of the evidence to justify an action of specific performance in com-
pelling a purchaser to take title . . . founded on adverse possession, and we there
held that continuous possession of thirty-two years was not sufficient but that the
vendor was bound to show in addition that the person in whom the legal title was
vested was not under such legal disability as would prevent the title from vesting
by adverse possession." 14 App. Div. 423 at 431, 43 N. Y. S. 1016 at 1022.
78 Recall, for example, the special problems arising when the vendor attempts to
claim adverse possession against the government in connection with encroachments
upon streets and highways.
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of titles on guard against too freely accepting adverse pos-
session as a complete cure.
Occasionally it is possible to claim that the vendor has cured
an objection based upon encroachment by obtaining rights based
upon an estoppel. This cure, of course, is useful in the case where
the vendor's buildings constitute the encroachment. In its most
frequent appearance, it depends on the establishment of facts
which show the adjoining landowners have recognized a "prac-
tical" boundary which is favorable to the vendor. The rule that
a practical boundary might, if recognized by the parties con-
cerned, become conclusive as an estoppel, binding upon them and
their privies in estate, seems to have been developed in New
York about the middle of the nineteeth century. 79 A chancellor
there once thought that
acquiescence in such cases affords ground not merely for
an inference of an original parol agreement, but for a direct
legal inference as to the true boundary line. It has been held
to be proof of so conclusive a nature that the party is pre-
cluded from offering any evidence to the contrary.
The rule seems to have been adopted as a rule of repose with
a view to the quieting of titles."
That view clearly made estoppel respectable as a separate theory
on which encroachment defects might be cured, but it did not
point out how there was much to choose between estoppel and ad-
verse possession. Especially is this true when it is noted that
the key requirement of "long acquiescence" tends to be similar
to the period required in the adverse possession cases.sl As a
practical matter, it might well be that the necessary period of
acquiescence is as long as the time of possession required to prove
title by adverse possession but it also might well be decided that
79 Reed v. Farr, 35 N. Y. 113 (1866) ; Baldwin v. Brown, 16 N. Y. 359 (1857).
80 See opinion by Selden, J., in Baldwin v. Brown, 16 N. Y. 359 at 363 (1857).
81 It was pointed out in Baldwin v. Brown, for example, that "in all cases in
which practical locations have been confirmed on evidence [of acquiescence], the
acquiescence has continued for a long period, rarely less than twenty years." 16
N. Y. 359 at 364.
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estoppel is still the cure to be preferred since it has fewer tech-
nical requirements attached to its validity than does adverse
possession.
The establishment of practical boundaries by acquiescence
of the parties involved is probably the most frequent setting for
the estoppel argument. A still more interesting problem arises
when the alleged estoppel is based on the doctrine of merger of
titles. Here the argument proceeds on the theory that when
title to both the encroaching premises and the premises encroached
upon are united in one owner, any defect due to an encroachment
is cured for purpose of subsequent sale of either of the proper-
ties. It was so argued with success in the New York case of
Schaeffer v. Blumenthal.12  There the beams of the vendor's
house were lodged in the wall of a building belonging to the ad-
joining landowner. The apparent encroachment was held insuf-
ficient to permit rejection of the vendor's title for both lots had,
at one time, been owned by the same person who had erected the
houses in question in the manner described. By so doing, he had
created a servitude upon the encroached lot so that any subse-
quent purchaser of the lot to which the encroaching structures
belonged was said to get a "clear and undisputable right" to rest
the beams of his house in the wall as long as the houses should
both exist.
The proposition of that case appears to have been accepted
without dissent, but the limits of its permissible extension seem
to have been set by the Illinois court in the case of Winters v.
Polin.SB The vendor there sought specific performance despite
the fact that a survey, made subsequent to the execution of the
sale contract, revealed the encroachment of bay windows sev-
eral inches onto the adjoining lot. It was shown that the pur-
chaser already owned the encroached premises and the vendor
argued that the conveyance of title to the encroaching structure
82 169 N. Y. 221, 62 N. E. 175 (1901).
83 309 Il1. App. 458, 33 N. E. (2d) 497 (1941). Leave to appeal was denied: 310
Ill. App. xix.
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would result in the merger necessary under the rule of the
Schaeffer case. The contention was rejected for two reasons.
It was thought, first, that the doctrine of merger could not be
applied prospectively. It was one thing to base estoppel on past
behavior of an ancestor in whom title to both parcels of land
had been united, but quite different to claim that estoppel could
spring from actions and legal relationships that had not yet
occurred. Second, even assuming that the circumstances would
preclude the present purchaser from questioning the matter dur-
ing the period of his ownership of both premises, what would hap-
pen if the present purchaser subsequently attempted to sell or
mortgage either parcel of land using the description which was
now the basis of negotiation? Answering its own question, the
court said it could not be done except by running the risk of fu-
ture litigation, hence the merger could not now be used to cure
the defect beyond any reasonable threat to peaceful enjoyment . 4
In this way, the court seemed to be saying that the real trouble
arose in compelling the purchaser to assume the risk of being
prepared, in the event that he chose to sell either parcel of land,
to defend his title in an action to force removal of the encroach-
ment or a suit for specific performance of the contract. "We
know of no rule," the court declared, "that compels a person
against his wishes to buy a law suit. "5
Any mention of devices available for the cure of title de-
fects due to encroachments must include a discussion of the pow-
ers of a court of equity to aid the vendor who has substantially
but not completely performed his bargain according to the letter
of the contract. Naturally, the use of such a power has been
peculiarly an equitable remedy, associated with specific perform-
ance, to be applied only with great caution. It usually takes
the form of a grant of specific performance with an abatement of
the purchase price to compensate for the damage done by the
encroachment, provided the encroachment is one which may be
84 The court's handling of this point was criticised in a comment on the case
appearing in 30 Ill. B. J. 301.
85 309 Ill. App. 458 at 462, 33 N. E. (2d) 497 at 499.
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compensable by an abatement of the price.80 In practice, this
has meant that equity will aid the vendor when the area en-
croached upon is of negligible value when compared to the total
value of the property being sold;8 7 where the measurements are
uncertain and removal can be accomplished with ease; S where
the encroachment fails to materially affect the value of the prem-
ises being sold; 9 or the normal or intended use thereof.90  If the
parties bargained for land as it stood without a survey, in terms
of "more or less," there has been relaxation with respect to all
of these requirements.91 In direct contrast, if the evidence has
indicated that freedom from encroachment is a major inducement
to the making of the contract of sale, the persuasive force of the
vendor's argument has waned and has often been completely
lost even though some combination of the foregoing factors has
been present.92
A less frequent form of equitable relief through specific per-
formance, but one quite as available under proper circumstances,
is a decree of performance coupled with a grant of additional
time for the vendor to perfect his defective title. Where the
vendor has substantially performed his contract on the date of
86 McGowan v. Pew, 147 Cal. 299, 81 P. 958 (1905) ; Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga.
346, 36 S. E. 796 (1900) ; Kuhn v. Eppstein, 219 Ill. 154, 76 N. E. 145 (1905) ; Cowan
v. Kane, 211 Ill. 572, 71 N. E. 1097 (1904) ; DeWolf v. Pratt, 42 Ill. 198 (1866) ;
Tobin v. Larkin, 183 Mass. 389, 67 N. E. 340 (1903) ; Lanyon v. Chesney, 186 Mo.
540, 85 S. W. 568 (1905).
87 In Sauer v. Bloch, 67 Misc. 657 at 659, 124 N. Y. S. 802 at 803 (1910), It ap-
peared that a wall encroached 4% inches upon the premises being sold. It was
held that "under the evidence based on the value of the lot. $78.00 will amply com-
pensate for the deficiency and it would be manifestly inequitable to defeat a
$53,000 purchase by a defect so inconsiderable that it can be compensated by such
a small sum."
88 The vendor, in Merges v. Ringler, 34 App. Div. 415, 54 N. Y. S. 280 (1898),
deposited an amount with the court and a referee determined the sum proper to
compensate for the defects. See also Smyth v. Sturges, 108 N. Y. 495, 15 N. E.
544 (1888) ; Keating v. Gunther, 57 Hun 591, 10 N. Y. S. 734 (1890) ; Wynne v.
Reynolds, 6 Paige 407 (N. Y. 1837).
89 Vogt v. Shumate, 213 Ky. 503, 281 S. W. 514 (1926).
90 Weintraub v. Siegel, 133 App. Div. 677, 118 N. Y. S. 261 (1909).
91 The case cited in note 90, ante, involved a contract specifying the dimensions
as "more or less." In Sheil v. Samaroyan Realty Co., 223 App. Div. 820, 228
N. Y. S. 425 (1928), the contract was subject to any state of facts "which an ac-
curate survey might show."
92 In Herring v. Esposito, 94 N. J. Eq. 348, 119 A. 765 (1923), the contract stip-
ulated that "buildings upon said premises are all within boundary lines of property
described-and that there are no encroachments thereon."
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performance, and has failed only with respect to an encroach-
ment which requires no great time or expense to remove, courts
of equity have often felt that the element of time may properly
be ignored and indulgence granted to the vendor until he can
perfect a good and marketable title without jeopardizing his right
to specific performance thereafter.9 3  A requirement of due
diligence is imposed upon the vendor to do what can be done
toward removing the defect, 94 so the vendor's own carelessness
which resulted in the creation of the encroachment, or any other
circumstance which would render specific performance inequita-
ble, will serve to bar reliefY5 Where additional time is granted,
it is common to have the rents of the land in question awarded
to the purchaser pending final performance and to allow the
vendor to have interest on the purchase money. Under such an
arrangement, the delay in bringing about the necessary cure
might extend for several years without destroying the vendor's
ultimate right to performance.96
Occasionally an attempt is made to procure judicial appro-
bation of a defective title without any accompanying decree of
specific performance or injunction. Most states, by legislation,
authorize chancery courts to quiet titles as well as to remove
clouds on the title to land. Under these statutes, an owner who
is entitled to maintain such an action may cure a title which is
defective because of an encroachment. Similarly, many states,
having adopted some local variation of the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act, have recognized that these statutes possess a
scope broad enough to include adjudication as to titles and rights
93 See Bispham, Principles of Equity (Banks Law Pub. Co., Philadelphia, 1919),
9th Ed., § 391.
94 Welland v. Huber, 8 Nev. 203 (1873) ; Bruce v. Tilson, 25 N. Y. 194 (1862).
In such cases, it seems to be sufficient if the vendor can make good his title by the
time of the decree: Collins v. Park, 93 Ky. 6, 18 S. W. 1013 (1892) ; Harriman v.
Tyndale, 184 Mass. 534, 69 N. E. 353 (1904) ; Dresel v. Jordan, 104 Mass. 407
(1870) ; Haffey v. Lynch, 143 N. Y. 241, 38 N. E. 298 (1894) ; Spencer v. Sandusky,
46 W. Va. 582, 33 S. E. 221 (1899).
95 Dikeman v. Sunday Creek Coal Co., 184 Il1. 546, 56 N. E. 864 (1900); Mc-
Laughlin v. Equitable Assurance Society, 38 Neb. 725, 57 N. W. 557 (1894).
96 Robinson v. Trufant, 97 Mich. 410, 56 N. W. 769 (1893).
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in land.9 7 It has, however, been pointed out that these declara-
tory judgment statutes are intended merely to modify the com-
mon-law rule that there is no justiciable controversy until a right
has been invaded. For this reason, they may not ordinarily be
invoked where an adequate remedy at law is available.9 6  It has,
for example, been held that a claim of title and a defense of
adverse possession may not be tried in a declaratory judgment
action inasmuch as the remedy of ejectment is full and adequate
for the purpose.9 9 That interpretation would seem to exclude the
possibility of seeking a declaratory judgment in a case where
a title proves defective because of an encroachment upon the
petitioner's land. On the other hand, however, a declaratory
judgment would seem to be entirely possible where the petitioner
could, by adverse possession or estoppel, establish a right to
maintain his own encroachment upon his neighbor's land.
Much the same reasoning can be applied to, and similar con-
clusions be reached concerning, statutory suits to quiet title or
to remove clouds upon the title to land. When the encroach-
ment is upon the land of the plaintiff, most courts would feel them-
selves constrained to dismiss the suit because of the requirement
that plaintiff must be in possession of the land in question when
the action is begun.' Exceptions to this requirement have been
made when the land in question is unoccupied and unimproved 2
or where plaintiff's failure to have possession is due to defend-
ant's fraudulent or forcible ouster, 3 but these exceptions provide
no major source of cure for encroachments of the type under
consideration. The Iowa case of DesMoines & Fort Dodge Rail-
97Faulkner v. City of Keene, 85 N. H. 147, 155 A. 195 (1931); Patterson's
Executors v. Patterson, 144 Va. 113, 131 S. E. 217 (1926) ; Gunter's Unknown Heirs
v. Logow, 191 S. W. (2d) 111 (Tex. Civ. App., 1945).
98 Empire Trust Co. v. Board of Commerce, 124 N. J. L. 406, 11 A. (2d) 752 (1940).
99 State v. Inman, 238 Ala. 555, 191 So. 224 (1939).
1 See, for example, the provisions of Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 7, § 1109; Cal. Code of
Civ. Pro. 1941, Tit. 10, Ch. 3 §§ 738 and 749; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 22, § 50;
Iowa Code 1946, Ch. 649 § 1; Mich. Stats. Anno. 1936, Tit. 27 § 545. See also
Holland v. Coleman, 162 Ala. 462, 50 So. 128 (1909) ; Dempsey v. Burns, 281 Ill.
644, 118 N. E. 193 (1917) ; Cummings v. Schreur, 236 Mich. 628, 211 N. W. 25 (1926).
2 McGookey v. Winter, 381 1ll. 516, 46 N. E. (2d) 841 (1943) ; Clay v. Hammond,
199 Ill. 370, 65 N. E. 352 (1902).
3 Bigelow v. Sanford, 98 Mich. 657, 57 N. W. 1037 (1894).
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road Company v. Whitaker,4 however, stands as a contradiction
for the court there, in an equity action to quiet title, considered
the claim of adverse possession by the defendant, whose elevator
was located in part on grounds belonging to the plaintiff rail-
road, as a cloud on the plaintiff's title, entitling plaintiff to a
decree quieting title, even though the defendant's answer, as
finally amended, did not expressly assert any claim to part of the
grounds. When the encroachment causing the defect in title con-
sists of an intrusion by plaintiff's buildings upon the land of a
neighbor, an action to quiet title or to remove a cloud may be
successfully maintained subject, of course, to plaintiff's ability
to prove a right to maintain his structure by reason of adverse
possession or estoppel.5
A final word might be said, in connection with litigation de-
signed to cure defects in title, as to the occasional decision
which denies a petition for positive relief but where the
court, in passing, makes a serviceable adjudication as to plain-
tiff's rights. One such case, that of LaCost v. Mailloux,6 arose
in Illinois. The defendant there, by counterclaim, sought a man-
datory injunction to compel plaintiff to remove an eight-inch
encroachment produced by a concrete sidewalk. The encroach-
ment was admitted but the chancellor, finding that no useful pur-
pose would be served by the destruction of the concrete walk,
merely ordered plaintiff to imbed brass plates so as to denote
the true boundary line and dismissed the counterclaim. The de-
cree was affirmed when the reviewing court noted that the de-
fendant's prime concern was one to avoid the danger that plain-
tiff might obtain a title by prescription. That danger being re-
moved, no other affirmative relief was necessary.
The development of title insurance and its availability in
most urban communities where problems of encroachments are
4 172 Iowa 394, 154 N. W. 604 (1915).
5Langstaff v. Mitchell, 119 Cal. App. 407, 6 P. (2d) 546 (1931); Gerbacht v.
Lake County, 328 Ill. 399, 160 N. E. 1 (1928) ; Unruh v. Martin, 129 Kan. 684. 284,
P. 361 (1930) ; Leach v. Taylor, 206 Ky. 28, 266 S. W. 894 (1924).
6401 Ill. 283, 81 N. E. (2d) 920 (1949).
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more apt to arise, generates a fair question as to what extent title
guaranty policies may provide a method for curing encroachment
defects. Realistically, there is no denying that title insurance
has become the business man's standard for the acceptance of
a title, and many lawyers have joined in wishing that procure-
ment of insurance against disturbance of the purchaser's rights
of ownership could be substituted for the degree of perfection re-
quired by the law's mythical and often none too predictable reason-
able man. If one assumes that the chief concern of the law is the
protection of the purchaser from the need of always being ready
to defend his title, and that the principal advantage of title in-
surance lies in the fact that it shifts the cost of defending, and
of paying losses arising from, litigation concerning the title in
question, it would seem to follow that courts should not hesitate
to recognize insurability as the test of marketability in the mod-
ern market. Such a rule would seem well calculated to bring law
into a better adjustment with business, but in fact the matter is
not quite as simple as logic would have it.
Take, as the first practical limitation on this proposition, the
fact that title guaranty policies rarely guarantee over encroach-
ments. In Winter v. Polin,7 a case already referred to, the vendor
agreed to furnish his purchaser with an insurance policy guaran-
teeing the title to the property in question. Once this was done,
he argued that such should be recognized as evidence of the mar-
ketability of title notwithstanding the existence of the encroach-
ment. The court was persuaded differently, however, when it was
revealed that "matters of survey" were excepted from the cover-
age of the particular policy which the vendor had procured.8
Such is the typical experience and only by special arrangement,
7 309 Ill. App. 458, 33 N. E. (2d) 497 (1941).
8 The exception of matters of survey was waived by the insurance company after
the suit had been filed. In describing the legal significance of this fact, the court
stated: "the sufficiency of the guaranty policy is to be determined by the date fixed
by the contract for closing the deal and not some time subsequent to the filing of a
suit for specific performance .... In the face of this situation, when officials of the
company state their policy did not cover any loss by reason of encroachments, by
what equitable principles was defendant bound to take the property subject to




with payment of special premiums, have title insurance com-
panies been willing to accept the risks arising from encroach-
ments. 9
Even with insurance policies which do guarantee against loss
arising from encroachments, it is still a matter of doubt whether
insurance may be taken as evidence of marketability. New York
precedents would indicate that the willingness of a title insur-
ance company to guarantee the vendor's title carries with it no
necessary implication that the title is or will be quiet on this
question. 10 These cases point out that the insurer, by issuing its
policy, does not imply that it believes the title is marketable but
rather merely that it has examined the risks and is willing to as-
sume them for the premium paid. In this way, the issue is
squarely whether the law should accept title insurance standards
as the test of marketability or, retaining its own standards, leave
title insurance as a practical but unofficial means of shifting busi-
ness risks.
Here, admittedly, there are arguments on both sides. The
case for acceptance was put by a Washington decision which holds
that, beyond doubt, the refusal of a title company to insure the
vendor's title is evidence of its unmarketability.11  There the
court said neither the title insurance company nor its attorneys
"had any interest in the main transaction and we can conceive
of no higher evidence of a want of marketability of title as the
term has been construed by this court, than these opinions. ' ' 12
Perhaps fairness requires a certain obligation to give as much
9 See Broadway Realty Corp. v. Lawyers Title Ins. & Trust Co., 171 App. Div.
792, 157 N. Y. S. 1088 (1916) ; Glyn v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 132 App. Div.
859, 117 N. Y. S. 424 (1909).
10 Zimmerman v. Cohen, 236 N. Y. 15, 139 N. E. 764 (1923) ; New York Investors,
Inc. v. Manhattan Beach Bathing Parks Corp., 229 App. Div. 593, 243 N. Y. S. 548
(1930) ; Fineman v. Callahan, 222 App. Div. 752, 225 N. Y. S. 401 (1927) ; Flanagan
v. Fox, 6 Misc. 132, 26 N. Y. S. 48 (1893).
11 Flood v. Von Marcard, 102 Wash. 141 at 146, 172 P. 884 at 886 (1918). In
that regard the court said: "We are convinced that the title was not free from
reasonable doubt .... That it was not such a title as a buyer would take when
exercising ordinary prudence in the conduct of his affairs is sufficiently evidenced
by the refusal of the title insurance company to guarantee it, and the refusal of
its general counsel, whose learning and skill in the law cannot be questioned, to
approve the title."
12 102 Wash. 141 at 147, 172 P. 884 at 886.
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credit to the insurer's decision to accept the risk as the court
was willing to give to the same insurer's opposite decision, both
being arrived at by use of the same careful and objective title
examination methods. In the last analysis, however, neither fair-
ness nor logic can extend the curative powers of insurance be-
yond certain other basic limitations. The insurer's liability, in
cases where encroachment defects defeat marketability, does
not go beyond payment of the costs of the unsuccessful defense
of the title plus the face amount of the policy; it is powerless to
restore rights that cannot be measured in terms of that amount
of money. Further, it must be recognized that the effect of title
insurance is determined as of the moment when the policy is
issued. It is imaginable that defects may arise between the mo-
ment of issuance and the time for the vendor's performance of
his contract.18  Finally, what of the contract of sale which re-
quires the vendor to tender both a marketable title and, in addi-
tion, a title guaranty insurance policy? So far, no court has been
willing to say that the procurement of insurance obviates or sat-
isfies the requirement of a marketable title.14
Perhaps the most sensible analysis of the place which title
insurance may play as a cure for encroachment defects has come
from a federal district court sitting in Connecticut. In a suit
for specific performance,15 decided there in 1934, it was argued
that a title guaranty company's offer to insure should be given
"just weight" in determining marketability because it was the
result of careful examination by experts whose business it was
13 Winters v. Polin, 309 Il1. App. 458, 33 N. E. (2d) 497 (1941) ; New York In-
vestors, Inc. v. Manhattan Beach Bathing Parks Corp., 229 App. Div. 593, 243
N. Y. S. 548 (1930). Meyers v. Van Schaick, 268 N. Y. 320, 197 N. E. 297 (1935),
affirming 243 App. Div. 523, 227 N. Y. S. 142 (1935), disclosed that "title Insurance
operates to protect a purchaser . . . against defects in or encumbrances on a title
existing at the date of such insurance. It is not prospective in its operation and
has no relation to liens or requirements arising thereafter." See 268 N. Y. 320 at
323, 197 N. E. 297.
14 The statement in Winters v. Polin, 309 Ill. App. 458 at 464, 33 N. E. (2d) 497
at 500, to the effect that the "sufficiency of the guaranty policy is to be determined
by the date fixed by the contract for the closing of the deal" might support the
implication that, under certain circumstances, the court might regard the title
guaranty policy as proper protection against defective title.
15 Plimpton v. Marrekeunk Cabin Colony, 9 F. Supp. 288 (1934).
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to calculate risks and support their statements with their for-
tunes. Admittedly there was risk; the very term "insurance"
implied it. But, the argument ran, since no title can with abso-
lute certainty be known to be perfect, and there exists no instru-
ment of precision to test it, "the marketplace has evolved, as
an effective substitute by way of protection, the institution of
title insurance, on which the marketplace must and does rely."16
Against this argument, the lines of reason preferred by the New
York courts were offered.' 7  The decision of the court plainly
showed that it was impressed by the insurability of the title.
While it was not willing to accept the judgment of the title in-
surance company as a substitute for its own, it had "no doubt
that the court, whether or not it may take judicial notice of the
general custom and practice with respect to title insurance, may
consider evidence of the custom and the weight given in the mar-
ketplace to title insurance.""' This, one suspects, is about as
close as the courts will go, when framing and judging the law,
considering the practical affairs of business.
VI. CoNcLUSIoNs
In summing up, it is hardly necessary to point out that in
one sense this discussion has come back to its point of beginning
for, in the last analysis, the problem is still one concerned with
the rationale of marketability. This time, however, the object of
the inquiry is more concerned with what the rationale should be
rather than with what it actually is.
If the main difficulty with this subject were simply to be able
to declare what should constitute marketability when title is jeop-
16 9 F. Supp. 288 at 314. In support of this argument, counsel cited Foehrenbach
v. German-American Title & Trust Co., 217 Pa. St. 331, 66 A. 561 (1907).
17 See note 9, ante, and New York Investors, Inc. v. Manhattan Beach Bathing
Parks Corp., 229 App. Div. 593, 243 N. Y. S. 548 (1930), affirmed in 256 N. Y. 162,
176 N. E. 6 (1931).
18 The court continued: "... an acknowledged expert and a senior officer of the
title company . . . points out that the practice of his company has been to draw
no distinction between a marketable and an insurable title, and to refuse insurance
regardless of any additional premium proferred if there was any reasonable doubt
of marketability." See 9 F. Supp. 288 at 313-4.
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ardized by the presence of encroachments, then the answer is
that the definition may be found strewn along the way this dis-
cussion has proceeded. As, in each case, there have been dif-
ferent dominating characteristics, so there have also been dif-
ferent standards of marketability for each of the main types of
encroachment defects. Decisions on one type of encroachment
have resembled those concerning another type only in their
common adherence to the maxim that substantial encroachments
defeat marketability while trivial ones do not. The maxim has
thus become a key to many locks, but it has at no time seemed to
possess the familiar characteristic true of most master keys, that
of reflecting a common denominator in the problems that they
unlock. When all the cases are viewed and reviewed, the conclu-
sion is still that there are three different types of encroachments
with three different tests for determining their effect on market-
ability.
Against such a background, the desirability of formulating a
new rationale of marketability, one which will include all three
types of encroachments, would seem to be obvious. Nor is it a
need that could be called new. It may be questioned, however,
whether the decisions of the courts hold much promise of help
in creating a useful rule since, in times past, the courts them-
selves have seldom thought of the problem in terms of an over-
all pattern within which the several subordinate rules could be
reconciled. This has been so regardless of whether the imme-
diate issue before the court was the classification of an encroach-
ment as substantial or insignificant, or the cure of a defect al-
ready acknowledged to exist. And it is likely so to continue as
long as the courts remain preoccupied with treating the subject
in terms of a number of mutually exclusive type-classes. 19
19 See, for example, the attempt in Volz v. Steiner, 67 App. Div. 504 at 508, 73
N. Y. S. 1006 at 1008 (1902), to formulate a general pattern. There the court said:
"In determining what is necessary to cure a defect of an encroachment onto ad-
joining land, consider the distinction between It and the case where the vendor
cannot give title to all the land he contracts to sell. In the latter case he defaults
on the vendee's legal right to get all the land he pays for. In the former case he
defaults on the vendee's right to maintain the buildings on the conveyed premises
in the same state as they exist at the time of conveyance. . . . Where title fails
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Some assistance will naturally always be provided by stat-
utes and rules of local bar associations. But overall statutory
regulation is not likely to develop from the present prototypes
for, in current practice, most statutes bearing on the problem of
encroachments and marketability are merely local or municipal
exceptions to general state-wide common law or equity rules.20
Local bar association rules for title examination seem equally
unpromising because of their tendency to become simply restate-
ments of rules which are unknown or generally overlooked by title
examiners. 21
As an alternative some attention has been given to the pos-
sibility of achieving a new rationale of marketability by the sub-
stitution of insurability for the standard of the hypothetical
reasonable man. Arguments exist on both sides of the question
and have been suggested earlier. More could be cited again if such
a review would reveal insurability as the unifying standard ca-
pable of becoming the new rationale. 22 But if, on the other hand,
such a substitution would only result in setting up title insurance
companies as quasi-administrative tribunals, organizations whose
fact-finding activities were to be carried on without benefit of any
basic formula other than a company policy dictated by the ability
of a given company's resources to assume risk, the result would
again not be especially desirable. The fact that the analysis would
be made by impartial experts must always be balanced by the fact
that these experts would have absolutely no reason, other than to
naturally, the vendee may object, but, where the objection is that part of the
building is erected on land to which the vendee is not entitled under the contract,
if at the time fixed for tender of the deed, there is a valid agreement with the
owner of the adjoining premises by which the vendee is entitled to maintain the
building as it then exists, it seems clear that the vendee is not justified in refusing
title for he will obtain all the land conveyed plus the right to maintain the building
as it then exists."
20 The present New York statute recognizes this when, in connection with legis-
lation authorizing property owners to maintain actions for injury to real property
due to building encroachments, it is provided that the right to sue shall not be
deemed to modify or alter other local statutes on the subject: N. Y. Cons. Laws,
Real Property Law, Art. 16, § 539.
21 Ward, Illinois Law of Title Examination (Burdette Smith & Co., Chicago,
1942), p. 258.
22 Foehrenbach v. German-American Title & Trust Co., 217 Pa. St. 331, 66 A. 561
(1907).
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promote good public relations, to adhere to any degree of stare
decisis in their decisions. What, then, is to be gained by substitut-
ing one type of uncertainty for another?
One is inclined to think, after a study of this sort, that per-
haps there is no single unifying rationale into which all the aspects
'f the problem can be fitted. The courts, without saying so in plain
Yords, seem to have decided not to attempt to define their terms
)eyond the elementary proposition that "substantial" encroach-
ments defeat marketability but "insignificant" ones do not. Each
case arising thereafter must be classed as substantial or trivial
according to its own facts. Such an approach is not novel to the
law nor unique with the encroachment problem and perhaps it is
the best one after all. Whenever a problem, from its very nature,
requires that the analyst use terms of relativity, perhaps it is much
safer to endure an apparent multiplicity of rules rather than to
seek for simplicity in handling and for uniformity of interpreta-
tion. Change is not desirable if it comes at the expense of those
advantages in perspective and experience such as the law provides
by its natural growth.
THE UNDERSIZED HOUSE: A MUNICIPAL PROBLEM
ROBERT MCCLORY*
T HERE IS NO question but what building costs sharply affect the
potential size of the intended structure. When costs are low,
the floor area and cubical content of any planned building will be
apt to expand for dollars can purchase more material and services.
Conversely, as prices rise, the money allotted for building pur-
poses will purchase less, thereby forcing a reduction in size or
resulting in a finished product of inferior quality. Nowhere is
this more evident than in the field of residential building where,
under present circumstances, people desiring to build are forced
to reduce the dimensions of their dream homes to fit their limited
budgets. In much the same fashion, large-scale operators, seeking
quick profits from a ready market, find it desirable to erect row on
row of cracker-box type dwellings, devoid of ornamentation and
minute in proportion. These undersized dwellings, whether
standing alone or in rows, are not only incompatible with the char-
acter of many of our residential areas but, in the long run, cannot
make for comfortable living. The adverse effect these three or
four-room homes will have upon a residential community primarily
consisting of substantial six to eight-room dwellings, erected when
costs were lower, is obvious. To prevent that blight, the question
of whether or not a municipal ordinance designed to regulate floor
area and cubical content could be validly enacted is a matter of
prime importance to many communities.
Any attempt to prevent the erection of undersized dwellings
in Illinois, thereby preserving the character of existing residential
areas, must necessarily be predicated upon valid restrictions con-
tained in building, zoning or other ordinances.' In the past, the
* Member, Illinois Bar; Village Attorney, Village of Lake Bluff, Illinois.
1 Illustration of such an ordinance may be found in the following excerpt taken
from the zoning ordinance of the Town of Southfield, Oakland County, Michigan.
It provides: "Area of buildings: No dwelling shall be erected or altered in this
zone (Residence 1) which provides less than five hundred twenty-five (525) square
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emphasis has been, on regulation designed to limit the maximum
use which might be made of property.2 The issue now is whether
statutory authority exists for minimum regulation, for no munici-
pal ordinance can stand unless it rests upon proper statutory au-
thorization. In that respect, municipal authority for such local
legislation is to be found, if at all, in provisions permitting the
municipality to adopt building ordinances, 8 to exercise police
power,4 or to promulgate zoning ordinances.5 The first of these
may be uncertain warrant for such regulation as the power con-
ferred grants the right to "prescribe the thickness, strength and
manner of constructing all buildings and . . fire escapes there-
on." It primarily intends regulation of such things as the mate-
rials which are to enter into the finished structure or the manner
of their incorporation to the end that the building will be struc-
turally safe.
The second, i. e. police power, while worded as a blanket au-
thorization to "pass and enforce all necessary police ordinances,"
is not so unlimited as it would, at first, appear for that provision
has been interpreted to limit the police regulation to only those
subjects over which the municipality has been given express au-
thority by other specific paragraphs of the statute.6  There is,
however, some support to be found for regulation of the type
feet of floor area per family at the first floor level, exclusive of any garage area or
area in any accessory building. Size of building: No dwelling shall be erected or
altered in this zone (Residence 1) which provides less than ten thousand (10,000)
cubic feet of content."
2 Covenants in deeds or restrictions on building imposed by subdividers are beyond
the scope of this article. It has not been uncommon, in such cases, to insert pro-
visions requiring the expenditure of a stated sum, but the amount mentioned has
proved to be woefully inadequate in most instances by virtue of the staggering
increase in construction costs. In addition, such covenants customarily operate
only for a stated time, the life of which, in many Instances, has already run out.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 24, § 23-70.
4 Ibid., § 23-105.
5 Ibid., §§ 73-1 to 73-10. See also Smith-Hurd Ill. Stat. Anno., Ch. 24, § 23-1,
particularly note 2.
6 See, for example, Consumers Co. v. City of Chicago, 313 Ill. 408, 145 N. E. 114
(1924) ; Moy v. City of Chicago, 309 Ill. 242, 140 N. E. 845 (1923) ; City of Marion
v. Criolo, 278 Ill. 159, 115 N. E. 820 (1917) ; City of Chicago v. O'Brien, 268 Ill.
228, 109 N. E. 10 (1915); People v. City of Chicago, 261 Ill. 16, 103 N. E. 609
(1913) ; City of Chicago v. M. & M. Hotel, 248 Ill. 264, 93 N. E. 753 (1911) ; Wice
v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 193 Ill. 351, 61 N. E. 1084 (1901).
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under consideration in the case of Moy v. City of Chicago.7 There
an ordinance designed to regulate laundries, and which imposed
the requirement that there should be "at least 1,000 cubic feet of
air space provided for each person employed therein," was found
to be valid. The court, after referring to the grant of police power,
also found sanction for the ordinance in a specific provision au-
thorizing municipal legislation designed to promote the public
health.8 It would seem to follow, therefore, that a municipal ordi-
nance fixing a minimum size for residential buildings might well
be sustained provided there was also specific authority for its
enactment in sections of the statute dealing with building, zoning,
or the like. 9
It is under the third aspect of municipal authority, i. e.
through the use of the zoning power, that an ordinance of the type
proposed might find its greatest support. The zoning provision of
Illinois was broadened by amendment in 1943, so that its preamble
now recites the desired end to be "that adequate light, pure air,
and safety from fire and other dangers may be secured, that the
taxable value of land and buildings throughout the municipality
may be conserved, that congestion in the public streets may be
lessened or avoided, and that the public health, safety, comfort,
morals, and welfare may otherwise be promoted."10
To accomplish those purposes, each municipality has been em-
powered, among other things, to (1) regulate and limit the height
and bulk of buildings hereafter to be erected; (2) to establish,
regulate and limit the building or set-back lines on or along any
street, traffic-way, drive or parkway; (3) to regulate and limit the
intensity of the use of lot areas, and to regulate and determine the
area of open spaces, within and surrounding such buildings; (4) to
classify, regulate and restrict the location of trades and industries
7 309 Ill. 242, 140 N. E. 845 (1923).
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 24 § 23-81.
9 Father Basil's Lodge v. City of Chicago, 393 ll. 246, 65 N. E. (2d) 805 (1946);
City of Bloomington v. Wirrick, 381 Ii. 347, 45 N. E. (2d) 852 (194-3); Moy v.
City of Chicago, 309 Ill. 242, 140 N. E. 845 (1923). See also Brougher v. Board
of Public Works, 107 Cal. App. 15, 290 P. 140 (1930).
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 24, § 73-1.
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and the location of buildings designed for specified industrial,
business, residential, and other uses; (5) to divide the entire
municipality into districts of such number, shape, area, and of such
different classes (according to use of land and buildings, height
and bulk of buildings, intensity of the use of lot area, area of open
spaces, or other classification) as may be deemed best suited;
(6 )to fix standards to which buildings or structures therein shall
conform; and (7) to prohibit uses, buildings, or structures in-
compatible with the character of such districts.1
The statute referred to appropriately closes with the admoni-
tory remark that in all ordinances passed "due allowance shall
be made for existing conditions, the conservation of property
values, the direction of building development to the best ad-
vantage of the entire municipality and the uses to which the
property is devoted at the time of the enactment of such an ordi-
nance," and that the power so conferred shall not be exercised
"so as to deprive the owner of any existing property of its use
or maintenance for the purpose to which it is then lawfully de-
voted, but provision may be made for the gradual elimination of
uses, buildings and structures which are incompatible with the
character of the districts in which they are made or located." 2
Certain parts of the present statute clearly indicate a purpose
to carry out original zoning concepts, to-wit: that in the interest
of public health, safety and welfare regulation may well be im-
posed prescribing maximum limits on height and bulk of buildings,
fixing their location with respect to lot lines, as well as to control
the uses to which structures may be put. It cannot be said, how-
ever, that in the interest of regulating maximums, the legislature
has overlooked the desirability of fixing minimum standards, for
there is much in the statute which looks in that direction. The
preamble, for example, suggests the desirability of conserving
the "taxable value of land and buildings" as well as preserving
the "public health, safety, comfort, morals, and welfare." There
11 Ibid., subsection (1) to (7).
12 Ibid., concluding paragraph.
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is specific authority for the "regulation" of, as well as limitation
upon, the height and bulk of buildings. Standards may be estab-
lished to which buildings and structures are to conform. Each
municipality may prohibit uses, buildings or structures "incom-
patible with the character" of established zoning districts. But
above all, with due regard to private rights, the municipality
may act to secure the "conservation of property values, the
direction of building development to the best advantage of the
entire municipality" in addition to bringing about the gradual
elimination of uses, buildings and structures which are "incom-
patible" with the character of the districts in which they are
located.
Regulation in these respects must, of necessity, take into
account the fact that values may be as effectively destroyed or
diminished by the introduction of cheap, shoddy, or skimpy con-
struction as they would be by permitting overbuilding in the
area. Health and comfort may be as seriously endangered in
residential areas by inadequate and insufficient housing as they
would be by the introduction of pest houses, factories and the like.
It would seem, then, that a zoning ordinance which prescribed
minimum dimensions for residential building, unless otherwise
shown to be arbitrary or unreasonable, should be valid in Illinois,
although it must be admitted there are no known decisions in
this state dealing precisely with the subject.
Attempts to secure these ends in other states have met with
varying success. Probably the leading case on the point is the
decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan in the case of Senefsky
v. La/wler.13 It was there held that a zoning ordinance which
required a minimum floor area of 1300 square feet was unreason-
able and invalid as applied to a plaintiff whose building plans
called for 980 square feet of usable floor space.14 The decision
13 307 Mich. 728, 12 N. W. (2d) 387, 149 A. L. R. 1433 (1943). Bushnell, J., wrote
a dissenting opinion concurred in by Butzel, J.
14 An analogous situation in this state would probably be found only in commu-
nities located In resort areas where housing accommodations are usually of
temporary character. Very few persons, in average residential areas, would desire
a reduction in minimum area requirements.
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cannot be said to stand for the proposition that all minimum
standards are invalid, for the court was careful to note that a
very substantial portion of existing dwellings in the area did
not measure up to the ordinance there sought to be applied, that
a large number of vacant lots would be materially restricted, and
that there was uncontradicted testimony to the effect that " 'there
were a lot of people who wanted to build smaller houses and they
couldn't build them after the ordinance was enacted.' "15 It fur-
ther appeared that plaintiff's contemplated structure would be
in as full accord with the requirements of public safety, health
and welfare, as one having a larger area of floor space. The
majority were content to order the issuance of a building permit,
saying it was not "necessary for decision . . . and we do not
hold that under proper circumstances a municipality may not
exercise its delegated police power"' 16 in the manner there
attempted.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Bushnell is even more force-
ful on the point. He wrote:
This question of minimum floor area is one of first impression
in this State. At the outset, we are confronted with the
elementary propositions that every intendment is in favor
of the constitutionality of an ordinance and the plaintiff
must bear the burden of showing that the one in question
has no real or substantial relation to public health, morals,
safety or general welfare . . . [The] power to zone is not
limited to a protection of the status quo, and the city may
validly plan its future development . . . [Ordinances] having
for their purpose regulated municipal development, the se-
curity of home life, the preservation of a favorable environ-
ment in which to rear children . . . the safeguarding of
the economic structure upon which the public good depends,
the stabilization of the use and value of property . . . are
within the proper ambit of the police power . . . The legis-
15 307 Mich. 728 at 738, 12 N. W. (2d) 387 at 389.
16 307 Mich. 728 at 742, 12 N. W. (2d) 387 at 390.
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lative authorities in the City of Huntington Woods are better
acquainted with the necessities of their city than we are .
They are also better able to determine whether the ordinance
in question will accomplish the desired result of stabilizing
and preserving property values . . . We cannot say that the
requirement . . . is clearly unreasonable because, under the
circumstances, it is at least a debatable question. Whether
or not the means adopted by defendant City will accomplish
the desired end is also debatable. That being the case, we
cannot substitute our judgment for that of the legislative
body which is charged with the responsibility of deciding
that question. 17
Viewed in that light, the decision in the Senefsky case is not
conclusive even though it appears to have been followed in two
later decisions from the same state.' In the most recent of
these, that of Elizabeth Lake Estates v. Waterford,19 the primary
reason for nullifying the minimum floor area requirement, there
fixed at 500 square feet, appears to have been the fact that the
township ordinance in question applied to only two square miles
out of the total thirty-six square miles in the township, the bal-
ance being left unzoned. When it is remembered that the Michi-
gan statute is not nearly as broad as the one found in this state, 20
and that there is at least tacit recognition in the Senefsky case
for some minimum standard, although perhaps not as high as the
17 307 Mich. 728 at 733-4, 12 N. W. (2d) 387 at 392.
18 Frischkorn v. Lambert, 315 Mich. 556, 24 N. W. (2d) 209 (1946) ; Elizabeth
Lake Estates v. Waterford, 317 Mich. 359, 26 N. W. (2d) 788 (1947).
19 317 Mich. 359, 26 N. W. (2d) 788 (1947).
20Mich. Comp. Laws 1929, Vol. 1, § 2634, provides: "The legislative body of
cities and villages may regulate and limit the height and bulk of buildings here-
after erected, and regulate and determine the area of yards, courts, and other
open spaces, and for such purposes divide any city or village into districts of such
number, shape and area as may be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes
of this section. Such regulations shall be uniform for each class of buildings
throughout each district, but the regulations in one (1) district may differ from
those in other districts. Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a
plan designed to lessen congestion on the public streets, to promote public health,
safety and general welfare, and shall be made with reasonable consideration, among
other things, to the character of the district, its peculiar suitability for particular
uses, the conservation of property values and the general trend and character of
building and population development." See also Mich. Stat. Ann. 1936 § 5.2932.
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1300 square feet there required, the way is still left open for
some form of regulation.2'
Similar questions have been considered in other states. The
Nebraska Supreme Court, in Baker v. Somerville,22 reversed
a trial court decree which had enjoined the defendants from pro-
ceeding with the erection of a one-story home containing approxi-
mately 1500 square feet of floor space as being in violation of a
city ordinance placing a minimum of 2000 square feet on one-
story residences. The zoning provision was extended to cover de-
fendants' property after the lot had been purchased, after a
building permit had been obtained, and after some $5,600 had
been invested in the partially completed structure. It seems to
have been conceded that the purpose of the ordinance was to dis-
courage the construction of one-story residences in an area where
other homes were two stories in height. The upper court not
only refused to give the ordinance retroactive effect but also de-
clared that a zoning provision could not be sustained on aesthetic
grounds alone as such would not "promote public health, safety,
morals or the general welfare. "2 Such language is clearly in ac-
cordance with general rules governing zoning regulations, but it
would not necessarily render invalid the minimum floor area
requirement, especially if the latter bore a reasonable relationship
to the character of existing buildings in the area involved.
21 In the unreported case of Most v. Township of Southfield, decided in 1944,
the Circuit Court of Oakland County, Michigan, upheld the ordinance quoted in
note 1, ante, fixing a minimum floor area of 525 square feet, on the ground that
there was no showing that the ordinance did not bear a reasonable relationship to
the welfare, peace and public health of the community, the court declaring that the
size of a building might have direct bearing on public health and welfare. Citation
supplied by the Chicago Regional Planning Association. In the more recent case of
Thompson v. City of Carrolton, 211 S. W. (2d) 970 (Tex. Civ. App., 1948), the
plaintiff sought to enjoin the enforcement of a part of a city zoning ordinance
which required a minimum floor area of 900 square feet. Plaintiff's application to
build a home containing an area of 752 square feet had been denied. The Court of
Civil Appeals, affirming the trial court, held that the section of the ordinance at-
tack was not unreasonable and that the minimum floor area requirement bore a
reasonable relationship to the general welfare. It declined to hold that the case
of Senefsky v. Lawler, 307 Mich. 728, 12 N. W. (2d) 387 (1943), was contra,
referring to distinguishing language in the majority opinion and also quoting with
approval from portions of the dissenting opinion.
22 138 Neb. 466, 293 N. W. 326 (1940).
23 138 Neb. 466 at 471-2, 293 N. W. 326 at 329.
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As a matter of fact, the same court, in the later case of Dundee
Realty Company v. City of Omaha,24 distinguished the earlier
holding of the Baker case when it sustained the validity of an
ordinance requiring a minimum area requirement of 1200 square
feet for two-story dwellings and of 1000 square feet for one-story
homes. After pointing out that the ordinance involved in the
Baker case had been repealed subsequent to the decision therein
and had been replaced with the one under consideration, the
court went on to state that the case before it did not conflict with
the earlier holding. It said:
The facts are not analogous. In that case, the engineer
testifying to parts of the ordinance now repealed stated that
the section in question was zoned purely for aesthetic reasons,
while in the instant case the facts deal decisively with the wel-
fare, morals and safety of the people of the city of Omaha
.. We hold . . . that such ordinance is not arbitrary or
unreasonable, as applied to plaintiff's land, but is to the
best intersts of the city of Omaha . . . [and is] constitu-
tional and valid.25
It may be said, then, that if an ordinance is predicated upon clear
evidence of necessity in the interest of public health, safety, and
the like, there is every reason to believe that it should withstand
attack.
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in the case of County Com-
missioners of Anne Arundel County v. Ward,26 likewise sustained
the denial of a writ of mandamus by which it was sought to compel
the issuance of a building permit for the erection of several rustic
cabins. The application for a license had been denied by the
lower court for non-compliance with a county zoning ordinance
which provided in part, that the area involved was to be "strictly
residential . . . limited to one-family residences . . . no house
shall be constructed to contain less than 3200 cubic feet." The
24 144 Neb. 448, 13 N. W. (2d) 634 (1944).
25 144 Neb. 448 at 455, 13 N. W. (2d) 634 at 637.
26 186 Md. 330, 46 A. (2d) 684 (1946).
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higher court, without commenting specifically on the subject of
the cubic feet requirement, held that the denial of the permit was
not arbitrary nor unreasonable.
27
A slightly different type of ordinance was involved in the
Florida case of City of West Palmn Beach v. State,28 for it di-
rected that "every new building or structure must substantially
equal that of the adjacent buildings or structures in said subdi-
vision in appearance, square foot area and height." Upon com-
plaint against the building inspector who had refused to per-
mit the erection of a five-room house, that portion of the ordi-
nance was declared invalid for the obvious reason that it provided
no adequate standards to be followed by the administrative of-
ficer, the failure to specify a minimum floor area appearing to
be the primary point for criticism. As the court itself observed,
when regulations of this type are to be imposed in order to pro-
mote health, welfare, safety and morals "it is necessary that
exactions be fixed in the ordinance with such certainty that they
not be left to the whim or caprice of the administrative agency." 29
So far as height is concerned, it is not felt that any useful
analogy could be made between the instant problem and cases
in which minimum height regulations have been considered.30
For one thing, the present popularity of ranch-type houses and
other one-story residences would seem to make obsolete decisions
such as that in City of Mobridge v. Brown31 which overthrew an
ordinance prohibiting one-story buildings, obviously designed to
prevent the spread of bungalows. In that regard a nip and
tuck decision by the highest court of New Jersey in the case of
27 The court was likewise not convinced by the argument that the "technical
violation of the regulations" should be excused in view of the "housing shortage."
See 186 Md. 330 at 340, 46 A. (2d) 684 at 688. See also Potts v. Board of Adjust-
ment, 133 N. J. L. 230, 43 A. (2d) 850 (1945), where an application to convert a
single-family dwelling to a two-family apartment, because of the "critical housing
shortage," was denied.
28-Fla.-, 30 So. (2d) 491 (1947).
29 -Fla.- at-, 30 So. (2d) 491 at 492.
30 The case of Brown v. Board of Appeals, 327 Ill. 644, 159 N. E. 225 (1927),
held invalid a provision of a zoning ordinance requiring that buildings in a certain
business area had to be "not less than forty feet" in height. See also annotation
on the point In 56 A. L. R. 247.
3139 S. D. 270, 164 N. W. 94 (1917).
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Brookdale Homes Incorporated v. Johnson32 is of more than pass-
ing interest,33 for it too dealt with an ordinance regulating
maximum and minimum heights for buildings in residential areas.
That ordinance specified that no building should be "erected
to a height in excess of 35 feet" or "with its roof ridge less
than 26 feet above the building foundation." It was held in-
valid, by a vote of seven to six, when the majority adopted and
approved a lower court opinion attacking the minimum height
limitation as an attempt to legislate a minimum cost.
An excerpt from the lower court opinion illustrates one side
of the argument. That court wrote:
It is insisted that the presence of buildings less than 26 feet
in height does not tend to conserve the value of property,
but rather tends to reduce ratables and thus increase the
general tax burden. The testimony of the single witness to
that effect lacks persuasion. . . . But be that as it may,
there is persuasive proof that there is a substantial demand
for one story houses in the neighborhood and that the cost
of construction of such houses may often be equal to, if not
greater than, the costs of construction of two or two and one-
half story houses. And, as pointed out for prosecutor, if
respondents' theory be sound, a municipality under the cloak
of its zoning power, might provide that no house costing less
than a certain sum should be erected in a specified area. This
it cannot legally do. For obviously such a provision or regu-
lation could not properly be said to be made 'with a view of
conserving the value of property and encouraging the most
appropriate use of land throughout such municipality.'
No person under the zoning power can legally be deprived
of his right to build a house on his land merely because the
cost of that house is less than the cost of his neighbor's
house.3 4
32123 N. J. L. 602, 10 A. (2d) 477 (1940), affirmed in 126 N. J. L. 516, 19 A.
(2d) 868 (1941).
33 It should be remembered that the Illinois Supreme Court, in Brown v. Board
of Appeals, 327 Ill. 644, 159 N. E. 225 (1927), relied largely on the earlier New
Jersey case of Dorison v. Saul, 98 N. J. L. 112, 118 A. 691 (1922).
34 123 N. J. L. 602 at 605-6, 10 A. (2d) 477 at 478.
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The dissenting opinion written by Justice Heher, concurred
in by five other justices, is much more persuasive. After com-
menting on the factual situation,3" the justice continued:
The classification in this respect is not unreasonable or ar-
bitrary. I hold the opinion that the general zoning scheme
takes the category of a reasonable regulation for public con-
venience, prosperity and welfare; and the particular provi-
sion is justly classable as an integral part of the plan. If,
for reasons of public safety and the like, dwelling houses
may be limited to a fixed maximum height, so also may a
minimum height be prescribed if reasonably necessary to
secure the use for which the land in the district is peculiarly
suitable, considered from the standpoint of the community at
large, and thus to conserve its character and value and pro-
mote the general prosperity and welfare. If not, dwellings
even less in keeping with the character of the district, e. g.,
shacks and the like, would be unobjectionable. Can it be
that our sovereignty is so circumscribed that one-room shan-
ties may not be excluded from a community peculiarly suited
to materially higher residential uses, and devoted to such,
even though this radical departure will substantially depre-
ciate property values and otherwise disserve the essential
public interest? In this behalf, the difference between such
structure and the common bungalow would seen to be one
of degree merely and not of kind; certainly, such classifi-
cation is not to be condemned as palpably unreasonable, arbi-
trary or oppressive. As said, we are not at liberty to nullify
a legislative enactment unless its constitutional invalidity is
not open to reasonable doubt. . . . Viewed as a whole, the
regulations are designed, not for the special benefit of par-
35 The court said there was evidence "tending to show that the use thus pre-
scribed, considered in relation to the character and location of the land, and the
existent dwelling houses and the general zoning scheme, is the most appropriate
and suitable; and that the erection of the banned bungalow type of structure upon
the vacant land in the district would result in a depreciation of land values and
a reduction of ratables to a degree materially affecting the public welfare. Re-
spondent is the owner of 'undeveloped' land in the district to the extent of 'about
3000 feet frontage'; and it is proposed to use these plots, in large part at least, for
the erection of bungalows to meet a 'demand for all living rooms on one floor.'
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ticular landowners, but for the material advancement of
the entire community as a social, economic and political unit. 6
It would seem that identical reasoning can well be applied with
respect to minimum floor area provisions.
While regulations of this character have not received en-
tirely favorable treatment at the hands of courts, there is enough
to indicate that if they are not applied in arbitrary fashion to
existing conditions,3 7 nor made invalid by retroactive features"8
or lack of suitable standards,89 there is some occasion to believe
zoning restrictions of the kind in question may be upheld in Illi-
nois. 40  Municipal officers, then, should be realistic and fortify
their intended action with adequate data assembled in advance
to meet constitutional attack. Before adopting such an ordinance,
a survey should be made of existing residences in the area to
be zoned. That survey should include not only the over-all size
of the buildings but the size of the room units as well. It might
even be wise to establish tables of valuation to show how taxables
might be affected by the erection of incompatible structures. From
such data, a reasonable and proper minimum area requirement
could then be calculated consistent with the realities of the situa-
tion. So fortified, it is doubted that authority for the adoption
of such a plan would be denied to the municipality. To hold other-
wise would mean that municipalities would be powerless to pre-
vent the erection of one, two or three room shacks in well-to-do
neighborhoods so long as the former met the bare structural re-
quirements of a municipal building code. 41
36 126 N. J. L. 516 at 527, 19 A. (2d) 868 at 873.
37 Senefsky v. Lawler, 307 Mich. 728, 12 N. W. (2d) 387, 149 A. L. R. 1433 (1943);
Elizabeth Lake Estates v. Waterford, 317 Mich. 359, 26 N. W. (2d) 788 (1947).
38 Baker v. Somerville, 138 Neb. 466, 293 N. W. 326 (1940).
39 City of West Palm Beach v. State, - Fla. -, 30 So. (2d) 491 (1947).
40 See, in support thereof, County Commissioners v. Ward, 186 Md. 330, 46 A.
(2d) 648 (1946) ; Dundee Realty Co. v. City of Omaha, 144 Neb. 448, 13 N. W.
(2d) 634 (1944).
41 It is believed that a stronger case for minimum floor area requirements can
be made out under the zoning powers granted by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 24,§§ 73-1 to 73-10. The possibility that a building ordinance might find approval
as a proper exercise of the police power, in the light of the decision in Moy v.
City of Chicago, 309 Ill. 242, 140 N. U. 845 (1923), should not be overlooked.
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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS.
CONTRACTS-REQUISITES AND VALIDITY-WHETHER OR NOT CONTRACTS
DESIGNED TO LIMIT VENUE IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE FEDERAL EM-
PLOYEES' ACT ARE VALID--The appeal taken in the recent case of Akerly
v. New York Central Railroad Company' required the United States Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to pass upon the validity of
an agreement designed to limit venue in proceedings arising under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. Plaintiff therein, a resident of Penn-
1 168 F. (2d) 812 (1948), reversing 73 F. Supp. 903 (1947). M iller, C. J., wrote
a dissenting opinion.
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sylvania, was injured in that state while working on a locomotive owned
by his employer, a New York railroad corporation. Subsequent to the
injury, the railroad company made an advancement of a sum of money
to plaintiff for living expenses, in consideration of which the plaintiff
agreed in writing not to sue the railroad in any court outside the state
where the injuries were sustained or outside the state where he resided
at the time of the accident. Plaintiff did sue the railroad to recover
damages for his injuries but brought the action in a federal district court
located in Ohio, contrary to the terms of his contract. The defendant
moved to dismiss on the ground of improper venue, supporting its mo-
tion by the agreement aforesaid, which motion was granted. On appeal
by plaintiff, predicated on the argument that the agreement was void
as a violation of Section 5 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act2 and
was also lacking in consideration, the majority of the higher court re-
versed the decision of the trial court and remanded the cause for further
proceedings.3 It found the agreement to be void on three grounds, to-
wit: (1) that as the venue provision of the statute forms an inherent
part of the employer's liability,4 any attempt to limit venue by contract
amounted to an attempt to exempt the railroad from liability; (2) that
public policy prohibits the enforcement of contracts which purport to
limit access to the courts; and (3) that there was no consideration for
the contract since the amount advanced was to be deducted from the
amount of any final settlement.5
It would appear that this is the first time that a federal court of
the rank indicated has had occasion to pass on the validity of agreements
of this character, although the issue has been raised heretofore and has
been decided both ways, principally because of a difference of opinion as
to the purpose intended by Congress when passing the statute in ques-
tion. The problem arises over the meaning of the word "liability" as
found in Section 5 of the statute. Was it designed to bear its usual
2 45 U. S. C. A. § 55 provides: "Any contract, rule, regulation or device what-
soever. the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to
exempt itself from any liability created by this chapter, shall to that extent be
void .... ." Italics added.
3 The dissent by Miller, C. J., was based on the idea that the consideration was
sufficient and the contract was not illegal as it did not affect the liability of the
defendant nor tend to exempt it from paying damages.
4 45 U. S. C. A. § 56, fixing venue, declares in part that "an action may be
brought in a district court of the United States, in the district of the residence of
the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant
shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action."
5 It is recognized that a contract lacking in consideration is unenforcible. For
the purpose of this discussion, however, it is assumed that the contract in question
was adequately supported by consideration. As to whether payment of a sum of
money to be credited on an eventual recovery is sufficient consideration, see 13
C. J. S., Contracts, § 154, and cases there cited.
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
connotation of responsibility to respond in damages or to possess some
esoteric meaning? On the surface, at least, there would appear to be
no reason for going behind the language of the act, nor is there any
glossary provided with the statute fixing a special definition, so unless
considerable judicial legislation is indulged in only contracts granting
exemption from liability would appear to be banned. The contract in the
instant case granted no such absolute exemption, hence did not fall clearly
within the statutory prohibition.
It has been decided that the prohibition against contracts designed
to exempt from liability does not apply to releases,6 but it is possible
that Congress may have intended that Section 5 should apply to both
contracts made before liability has accrued, that is to those designed to
prevent it from ever arising,7 and to those made after the occurrence of
injury but not made to operate as releases.8 The statute does not fix the
time of making of the contract as the basis for testing validity, hence
the prohibition should not be limited solely to invalidate contracts made
before injury. But does it prohibit anything more than contracts designed-
to "exempt" from liability? Wherever there is liability the employer can-
not escape by any contract short of a release, but is there warrant for
giving strange meanings to the word "liability" so as to strike down
agreements, whenever made, which leave liability to be determined?
A federal district court sitting in Illinois, in the case of Sherman
v. Pere Marquette Railway Company,9 by taking parts of Sections 5
and 6 of the statute in question and adding them together, came up with
the idea that an agreement of the type in question was invalid on the
theory that the comprehensive phraseology of Section 5 included contracts
the purpose or intent of which was to enable the common carrier to exempt
itself from liability to suit if not entirely then at least in the district in
which the defendant was doing business at the time of commencing the
action.' 0
Much the same idea was adopted by a majority of the judges of the
Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Petersen v. Ogden Union Railway
6Callen v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 332 U. S. 625, 68 S. Ct. 296, 92 L. Ed. 235
(1947). The court indicated that a release is not a device "to exempt from lia-
bility but is a means of compromising a claimed liability and to that extent
recognizing its possibility."
7 See, for example, Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. Wagner, 239 U. S. 452, 36 S. Ct.
135, 60 L. Ed. 379 (1915).
8 Duncan v. Thompson, 315 U. S. 1, 62 S. Ct. 422, 86 L. Ed. 575 (1941). See
also annotation in 166 A. L. R. 648.
9 62 F. Supp. 590 (1945).
10 This concoction seems to have appealed to the majority of the court deciding
the instant case, for it followed much the same recipe.
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& Depot Company,11 only there the agreement was one not to sue in any
court except the "District Court of the United States, Northern Division."
That case presented a situation somewhat different from the one posed
in the instant problem and also from that involved in the Pere Marquette
case, in that the claimant was limited to suit in one federal court whereas
the instant agreement allowed the claimant to sue in either a state or
federal court anywhere in the state while the earlier federal case dealt
with an agreement which named one state and one federal forum. Courts
achieving the same result as that attained in the instant case, however,
do not appear to have given much regard to such distinctions, being of
the opinion that any restraint by agreement is improper.'
2
At this point, it should be noted that while Section 6 is commonly
referred to as a "venue" statute it is, in reality, more complex. It fixes
venue for federal courts, as a federal statute can properly do, at the same
time that it makes federal jurisdiction concurrent with that of equivalent
state courts. It does not purport to fix the venue of state tribunals for
that is a matter of state regulation. But it is unnecessary to go to Section
5 of the statute to determine which provisions of Section 6 may be the
subject of valid contract and which may not. It is elemental that while
jurisdiction cannot be conferred or waived by litigants, venue may be
a matter of personal choice unless otherwise specifically prohibited by
statute." Jurisdiction of state courts over proceedings under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act may not be contracted away, any more than
this is possible as to the federal courts. Venue provisions, however, whether
in relation to state or federal courts may be made the subject of valid
contract for there is no provision in the act to the contrary. Viewed in
this light, the holding in the Utah case is correct even if the reasoning
is unsound, but the same thing cannot be said of the other cases, including
the instant one. If Congress wants to say that the venue provisions of
Section 6 cannot be waived, it can do so. Until that time, courts should
not interfere with private arrangements which violate no express
legislative command nor undermine constitutional requirements.
Prior to the decision in Sherman v. Pere Marquette Railway
Company,1 4 courts were having little difficulty with the question. They
understood that the term "liability" as used in the Federal Employers'
11110 Utah 573, 175 P. (2d) 744 (1946). But see the concurring opinion of
Larson, Ch. J., and the dissenting opinion of Pratt, J., which appear to be much
better reasoned than the majority one.
12 Compare Krenger v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 8 F. R. D. 65 (1947), and Fleming
v. Husted, 68 F. Supp. 900 (1946).
13 Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corporation, 308 U. S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153, 84 L. Ed.
167, 128 A. L. R. 1437 (1939).
14 62 F. Supp. 590 (1945).
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Liability Act meant one thing, while concepts such as "jurisdiction" and
"venue" meant something else. As early as 1936, for example, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Detwiler v. Lowden, 15 held valid an
agreement by an injured employee not to sue his employer except in the
state of the employee's residence or in the state where the injury was
inflicted. A federal district court sitting in the same state later came
to the same conclusion,'" as did another federal court in Missouri. 7 Even
more remarkable, perhaps, is the fact that a different district court judge,
sitting in the same federal District Court in Illinois, after the decision
in the Pere Marquette case, held a similar contract to be valid1 8 despite
the influence of the earlier decision.
It is unfortunate, then, that the first and only higher federal court
holding on the subject has followed not only the weaker line of reasoning
with its predeliction for judicial legislation 9 but that it supports the
earthy and unprincipled result that plaintiffs, with the approval of the
judiciary, may now go "shopping for a judge or a jury believed to be




C ORPORATIONS--CoRPORATE EXISTENCE AND FRANCHISE-WHETHER
AMENDMENT TO ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION DESIGNED TO CANCEL
ACCRUED BUT UNDECLARED PREFERRED DIVIDENDS ON CUMULATIVE
PREFERRED STOCK IS VOID AS TO OBJECTING STOCKHOLDERS--The transition
in economic levels from depression to war-born prosperity brought with
it a problem which was dealt with, for the first time in Illinois, in the
15 198 Minn. 185, 269 N. W. 367, 107 A. L. R. 1054 (1936).
16 Detwiler v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 15 F. Supp. 541 (1936). See also, from
the same court, the holding in Clark v. Lowden, 48 F. Supp. 261 (1942).
17 Herrington v. Thompson, 61 F. Supp. 903 (1945).
18 Roland v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 65 F. Supp. 630 (1946).
19 The recognized judicial function of interpreting ambiguous statutes is far re-
moved from writing laws to suit judicial beliefs: Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 154 U. S. 362, 14 S. Ct. 1047, 38 L. Ed. 1014 (1894).
20 Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 815 U. S. 698 at 706, 63 S. Ct. 827 at 831, 86 L.
Ed. 1129 at 1135, 146 A. L. R. 1104 at 1109 (1941).
21 Editorial Note: Since the foregoing material was written, the plaintiff's choice
of a forum has been lessened considerably by the adoption of Section 1404(a) of
the new Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. A. § 1404 (a). As to the application thereof to
suits arising under the Federal Employers Liability Act, see Ex parte Collett,
- U. S. -, 69 S. Ct. 944, 93 L. Ed. (adv.) 901 (1949). In the event Congress
should amend the Judicial Code in this respect, the foregoing material may possess
prime significance. See also, on the specific point concerned, the decision in
Kringer v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 174 F. (2d) 556 (1949), where the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, Swan, C.J., dissenting, reached a similar result to that
attained in the instant case.
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recent case of The Western Foundry Company v. Wicker.1 The problem
grew out of the burden of accrued dividends which have accumulated on
the cumulative preferred stocks of many corporations, thereby preventing
the resumption of dividends on the common shares. In that case, the
defendant was a minority shareholder of both cumulative preferred and
common stock in the plaintiff corporation. Substantial accumulations had
accrued on the preferred stock when the plaintiff attempted to amend its
articles of incorporation, with the consent of two-thirds of the share-
holders of each class of shares, so as to cancel all right of the preferred
shareholders to the accrued but undeclared dividends by making changes
in the corporate capital structure. 2 Defendant neither attended the
stockholders' meeting called to vote on the amendment nor voted in favor
thereof, but frequently objected that the purported amendment was void.
Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to establish the validity of the
amendment, at which time the defendant counterclaimed for the payment
of all dividends accumulated on the preferred stock prior to the amend-
ment as well as for dividends declared subsequent thereto on both the
preferred and common shares. The trial court found in plaintiff's favor
but the judgment was reversed by the Appellate Court for the First
District when it held the amendment to be void insofar as it sought to
cancel the accumulated unpaid preferred dividends. Leave to appeal
having been granted by the Illinois Supreme Court, that court reversed
the holding of the intermediate court and reinstated the decision of the
trial court to the extent that it held the amendment valid.
The fundamental question as to whether or not it is possible, by
forced amendment of the articles of incorporation, to cancel the right
to accrued cumulative dividends has never before been decided in Illinois,
either under the present Business Corporation Act or any prior statute.
For that matter, while many different phases of the problem have been
made the subject of extensive treatment in legal publications,- there are
1403 11. 260, 85 N. E. (2d) 722 (1949), reversing 335 Ill. App. 106, 80 N. E. (2d)
548 (1948).
2 The purpose of the amendment was to eliminate an operating deficit and to
permit the resumption of the payment of dividends. It was to be made pursuant
to authority allegedly contained in plaintiff's articles of incorporation to the effect
that "the corporation shall not, without the consent of the holders of at least two-
thirds (%) in amount of the preferred stock of the corporation at the time out-
standing ... alter or change the preferences hereby given to the preferred stock ...
[But] subject to the limitations hereinabove set forth, the authorized capital stock
of the corporation may be changed, the rights and preferences of the preferred
stock may be changed" etc. Although the corporation was organized under the
1919 Act, the holding in the instant case clearly reflects what the attitude of the
court would be to a problem arising under the present Business Corporation Act.
3Dodd, "Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations," 55 Harv. L. Rev. 780 (1942).
See also discussions in 17 Bost. U. L. Rev. 733; 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 104; 12 U. of
Cinn. L. Rev. 576; 40 Col. L. Rev. 633; 25 Corn. L. Q. 431; 9 Duke L. J. 76; 55
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relatively few cases in the country where the attempt has been made to
cancel such dividends outright,4 most of the cases involving voluntary
exchanges of stock with loss of accrued dividends occurring only as an
incident.5 Unlike its English counterpart, the Illinois corporation possesses
only those powers which are clearly conferred upon it by statute,' any
ambiguity being resolved against it,7 hence the answer to the problem
must be found, if at all, in statutory enactment 8 which would require
resolution of the subordinate problem as to whether any existing
statutory provision should be given retroactive or only prospective
operation.
While the provisions of Section 52 of the Business Corporation Act,'
dealing with amendment to the articles of incorporation, are generally
quite broad, only one sub-section thereof is in any way germane. It
permits the corporation, upon receiving sufficient approval from the
shareholders, to change the "preferences, qualifications, limitations,
restrictions, and the special or relative rights in respect of all or any
part" of its shares.'" Although the statute makes no specific reference
to dividends, the authority to change "preferences" among shares might
be considered adequate for this purpose since one common form of
preference between groups of shareholders is with respect to dividend
payments. But while the authority may be present to change preferential
Harv. L. Rev. 71; 54 Harv. L. Rev. 488; 33 Ill. L. Rev. 217; 59 Mich. L. Rev. 1201;
26 Minn. L. Rev. 387; 6 Ohio St. L. Rev. 313; 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 789; 7 U. of
Pitts. L. Rev. 326; 19 St. Johns L. Rev. 139; 29 Va. L. Rev. 1; and 46 Yale L. J.
1055. The author of a comment on the case of Consolidated Film Industries. Inc.
v. Johnson, 22 Del. Ch. 407, 197 A. 489 (1937), appearing in 16 CHICAGO-KENT
RFviEw 286, points out what the probable holding would be under the Illinois statute.
4 Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 A. 115 (1936), involved an exchange
of stock and a cancellation of preferred dividends. Consolidated Film Industries,
Inc., v. Johnson, 22 Del. Ch. 407, 197 A. 489 (1937), dealt with a compulsory ex-
change of shares as well as a cancellation of accrued preferred dividends. See
also Harbine v. Dayton Malleable Iron Co., 61 Ohio App. 1, 22 N. E. (2d) 281
(1939) ; Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co., 184 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 13 (1906) ; Morris v.
American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 A. 696 (1923).
5 See, for example, Kreicker v. Naylor Pipe Co., 374 Il1. 364, 29 N. E. (2d) 502
(1940), where the corporation amended its charter to provide for the issuance of
prior preferred stock with an option on the part of the existing preferred stock-
holders to exchange the preferred for the prior preferred. If exchange occurred,
the stockholder waived the right to accrued dividends but the exchange was not
compulsory and the shareholder who declined to exchange retained his right to
the old stock with its accumulated dividends. The court held no vested rights
were impaired, hence treated the amendment as being valid.
6 City of Marion, Ill. v. Sneeden, 291 U. S. 262, 54 S. Ct. 421, 78 L. Ed. 787 (1934).
7 People ex rel. Lydston v. Hoyne, 182 Ill. App. 42 (1913).
8 Haberer v. Smerling, 225 I. App. 336 (1922).
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 157.52.
10 Ibid., § 157.52(g).
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dividend features as to the future, that is far different from saying there
is authority to do so with respect to the past.
The Delaware Corporation Act, although not a verbal duplicate of
the Illinois statute, not only contains a substantially similar amendatory
provision but one which is likewise lacking in expression as to retroactive
operation." When passing upon the application of this statute to a
situation much like that found in the instant case, the Delaware Supreme
Court once said that it "authorizes nothing more than it purports to
authorize, the amendment of charters. The cancellation of cumulative
dividends already accrued through passage of time is not an amendment
of a charter. It is the destruction of a right in the nature of a debt, a
matter not within the purview of the section.' '12 The court, as a conse-
quence, held the statute to be without retroactive effect.
Much the same view was exhibited in the Ohio case of Harbine v.
Dayton Malleable Iron Company13 where the court, dealing with a statute
permitting changes in shares," also regarded as illegal an attempt to
cancel cumulative dividends. The Ohio legislature, however, realizing
the problem and the necessity for its solution, soon thereafter amended
the statute to add further authority to make changes in the corporate
structure to the point where the change might include the "discharge,
adjustment or elimination of rights to accrued undeclared cumulative
dividends" on any class of shares.' 5 Under a New Jersey statute, the
funding or satisfying of dividends in arrears may be accomplished by
the "issuance of stock therefor or otherwise." Statutes of this character
not only recognize the problem, which is more than can be said for the
one in Illinois, but they also prevent rise of the claim that the right to
dividends can be called a vested one, at least prior to declaration. As
these statutes become part of the contract between the shareholder and
11 Rev. Code Del. 1935, Ch. 65, § 26. The statute authorizes amendment, among
other things, by "increasing or decreasing its authorized capital stock or reclassify-
ing the same, by changing the number, par value, designations, preferences, or
relative, participating, optional, or other special rights of the shares, or the qualifi-
cations, limitations or restrictions of such rights, or by changing shares with par
value into shares without par value." See also Del. Corp. Law Anno., The Cor-
poration Trust Co., Chicago, 1947, p. 151.
12 Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391 at &13, 190 A. 115 at 125 (1936).
13 61 Ohio App. 1, 22 N. E. (2d) 281 (1939).
14 Page's Ohio Gen. Code Ann. 1938, § 8623-14, permits the corporation to amend
the charter so as to change "issued or unissued shares of any class whether with
or without par value into a different number of shares of the same class, or into
the same or a different number of shares of any other class or classes with or
without par value, theretofore or thereby created."
15 Ibid., § 8623-14(i), added by amendment in 1939, reads: "... which change, If
desired, may include the discharge, adjustment or elimination of rights to accrued
undeclared cumulative dividends on any such class."
16N. J. Stat. Ann. 1939, § 14:11-1(n).
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the corporation, the former cannot claim that to be vested which he has
agreed shall be purely contingent.
Even if the Illinois act were broad enough to deal with the question,
there is nothing in its terms to indicate any purpose to make it retro-
spective in operation. On that score, the Illinois Supreme Court once
observed that no "rule of interpretation is better settled than that no
statute will be allowed a retrospective operation unless the will of the
General Assembly is declared in terms so plain and positive as to admit
of no doubt that such was the intention. Retrospective laws, although
they may be valid, are looked upon with disfavor, and an intention that
laws shall have such operation will not be supposed unless manifested
by the most clear and unequivocal expressions. '"7 Despite this, the same
court came to the conclusion in the instant case that what was essentially
a retroactive charter amendment should be sustained. To accomplish that
result, it had to reject the idea that shareholders' rights to accrued
dividends could be said to be "vested" and, instead, was forced to treat
the same as nothing more than a prospective "preference" subject to
cancellation in the manner agreed upon.
It is true that no dividend or dividend right can be called "vested"
prior to its declaration,18 but is it true, as the court said, that non-
declaration of cumulative preferred dividends merely enlarges the size
or quantity but does not change the character of the contractual right
of the shareholder? The average holder of cumulative preferred stock
would think otherwise, regarding the passed dividend as his due but
with its enjoyment temporarily postponed until more favorable times.
It is at this point, then, that a clear break occurs between the instant
case and other American holdings. One thing is certain, however, and
that is that the Illinois Supreme Court has shown the way by which it
will be possible to clear a backlog of arrearages on outstanding issues of
cumulative preferred stock.
G. W. HEDMAN
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE-PAIIT1ES--WHETtHER CLASS SUIT MAY BE
MAINTAINED AGAINST ONE DEFENDANT AS REPRESENTATIVE FOR GROUP OF
NON-JOINED PARTIES DEFENDANT ON CLAIMS GROWING OUT OF LEGAL
DEMANDs-A provocative challenge concerning the extent to which a
fusion between law and equity has been produced by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure grew out of the recent case of Montgomery Ward &
17 People v. Deutsche Evangelisch Lutherische, etc., Confession, 249 Ill. 132 at
137, 94 N. E. 162 at 165 (1911).
18 Beers v. Bridgeport Spring Co., 42 Conn. 17 (1875).
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Company, Inc. v. Langer.1  The plaintiff there sued Langer and some
seventy-one others in the United States District Court sitting in Missouri 2
to recover damages for an alleged libel. The individual defendants were
sued as individuals, as members of a national labor union and one of its
locals, and also as representatives of the entire membership of the un-
incorporated associations3 The union organizations, not being sui juris
in Missouri, were afterwards dropped as parties and the remaining
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the principal ground that
a complete diversity of citizenship did not exist. The District Court,
when considering the motion, passed over the stated ground, proceeded
to examine into the right of the plaintiff to bring a class suit, and
concluded that Rule 23(a) (1) of the Federal Rules was not applicable
to al action at law. When plaintiff chose not to amend the complaint
to divest the case of its representative character, the action was dismissed.
On appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, that court, by a unanimous holding, reversed and remanded the
cause, treating the class action device as being applicable to the entire
field of civil litigation coming before the federal courts. It said, in part,
that if "courts will disregard the ancient and often arbitrary distinctions
between actions at law and suits in equity and will permit the Rule to
operate in all cases to which it justly and soundly may be applied, it
will serve its intended purpose."'
Although the device of the class or representative suit was developed
by equity and was not, heretofore, available for use in law actions,5 no
serious issue can be taken with the interpretation given to Rule 23 by
the court from the technical standpoint, however novel its effect may be.
Not only did the enabling statute empower the United States Supreme
Court to prescribe rules for the district courts so as to secure one form
of action for law and equity,6 but the rules so adopted were expressly
declared to be applicable to all civil actions, with certain exceptions not
1168 F. (2d) 182 (1948). Johnsen, J., wrote a specially concurring opinion.
2 Jurisdiction was founded on diversity of citizenship.
3The basis for a class suit was said to be Rule 23(a) (1) of the Rules of Civ.
Pro. for U. S. District Courts, 28 U. S. C. A. foll. § 723c, which provides: "If
persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring
them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the
adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the
character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is (1) joint,
or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to
enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it."
4168 F. (2d) 182 at 187.
5 Markt & Co., Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co., Ltd., [1910] 2 K. B. 1021.
048 Stat. 1064; 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 723b and 723c.
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here involved.' The letter of transmittal accompanying the rules indicated
a deliberate purpose to provide but one form of action in the federal
courts for suits heretofore designated as being in law or equity.8 In
addition, the advisory committee, in a note to Rule 23(a), observed that
while the same was a substantial re-enactment of former Equity Rule 38,
which also dealt with representative suits, the revision was intended to
apply "to all actions, whether formerly denominated legal or equitable. "9
There is ample basis, therefore, at least on paper, for the instant holding.
But declaring that a class suit can be maintained in a law action is one
thing; making the principle work is another. The court has raised the
cover of a legal Pandora's box from under which the "misery and evils"
that confronted Epimethus will be deemed mere trifles compared to those
that can harry a legal scholar as he considers the effect of a judgment
in personam rendered as at law in a suit brought against a class of
defendants.
Once the question of whether a class suit will lie on legal demands
is answered affirmatively, the specially concurring opinion rendered by
Judge Johnsen in the instant case becomes of greater interest than the
main opinion, particularly because of his comments with respect to the
usefulness of any judgment which may be rendered therein. He first
notes that, as a matter of Missouri substantive law, members of non-profit
associations are not liable for the tortious acts of their officers or of other
members in the absence of proof of authorization, ratification, or
participation. Second, he states that pecuniary liability cannot attach,
as a result of the judgment, against those defendants not personally
before the court. But he indicates the judgment might be helpful, third,
in reaching the association's assets, and fourth, that it could probably
serve to foreclose all questions against the membership as a group,
leaving only the need to bring separate actions against the several
members of the class wherein the issue could be limited simply to the
question of their participation in, or authorization or ratification of, the
conduct held actionable.
A seemingly fundamental defect in the plaintiff's case ought to be
examined at the outset before considering the indicated consequences of
a judgment, if one were rendered against the defendants. The plaintiff
sued all of the members of the union as a class, presumably on the theory
7 The exceptions referred to in Rule 1, 28 U. S. C. A. foll. § 723c, could not apply
to class actions.
8 See letter of the Chief Justice, U. S. Supreme Court, to the Attorney General
set forth in Manual of Federal Procedure (West Pub. Co., St. Paul, 1940), p. vii.
9 28 U. S. C. A. foll. § 723c, note to Rule 23.
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that the right sought to be enforced against the class was a joint one."°
Yet it does not appear that a truly joint right actually exists among
members of an association such as the one in the instant case. At most,
the defendants there were no more than alleged joint tort-feasors for
their association was not organized for profit and had no other legal
status. Being no more than joint tort-feasors, no jural relationship was
present among them which could be termed joint in the sense in which
that term has been applied as a prerequisite to the bringing of a class
suit. 1 Joint tort-feasors cannot be considered to be essential parties to
an action brought against any one of them for they are, usually, severally
liable and may not, in the absence of statute, get contribution from one
another. Unless the doctrine has now been developed that any group of
allegedly joint tort-feasors may be sued as a class, if sufficiently numerous
and joinder would be difficult, it is hard to believe that the defendants
in the instant case are members of a class as is contemplated by the rule
in question.
Supposing for the purpose that they are, consideration must then
be given to that which will follow in the wake of a judgment against
the class. What, first, of pecuniary liability? Judge Johnsen remarks
upon the fact that no jurisdiction to enter a personal judgment against
the class defendants existed under former Equity Rule 38. If this be
true, and in view of the fact that the new rules were not designed to
"change previous jurisdictional concepts,'" the federal courts would
not now possess the necessary jurisdiction to pronounce a binding
judgment in personam against the represented defendants. There is a
complete absence of case law on this precise point, either in support of,
or in opposition to, the judge's contention. While some actions of legal
character involving the doctrine of virtual representation have been
maintained in code jurisdictions, not one of them was an action designed
to recover money damages against the class defendants. 13 In addition,
a reading of the textual authorities is no more profitable. At best, the
comments are inconclusive;14 at worst, the question is disregarded,'5
10 The principal opinion so regarded it: 168 F. (2d) 182 at 187.
11 It is here assumed that the reference in Rule 23(a) (1) to a "joint" right is
designed to follow the pattern established under former Equity Rule 38. There
the joint factor was determined from the presence of jural relations among the
members of the class: Moore, Federal Practice (Mathew Bender & Co., Inc., Albany,
N. Y., 1938), Vol. 2, p. 2235. That author rejects the need for a joint proprietary
interest or for the presence of a common fund, indicating rather that the true
class suit should be one wherein, but for the class action device, the "joinder of all
interested persons would be essential." Ibid., p. 2236.
12 See 28 U. S. C. A. § 723b.
13 The cases are collected in 39 Am. Jur., Parties, § 46, note 20.
14 See, for example, Moore, op. cit., p. 2283 et seq.
15 39 Am. Jur., Parties, §§ 44 and 52.
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probably because of a universally accepted attitude, prior to the codes,
that representative suits against class defendants were only to be brought
in equity concerning some res over which the court could extend its
power and to which it was obliged to confine the decree.
There being no precedent on, the particular question, it becomes
necessary to examine into the general nature of judgments in personam.
It is elementary, in fact it is a substantive right of every litigant, that
no tribunal shall have the power to make a binding adjudication as to
the rights in personam of the parties except where it has acquired
jurisdiction over them by due process of law.1" The due process required
when the proceeding is strictly one in personam, that is one brought to
determine personal rights and obligations, demands either valid personal
service or a voluntary appearance in the cause.' 7 Such being the case,
it can hardly be said that pecuniary damages can be assessed against the
class members in a representative suit, especially if they are present
in the litigation only by virtue of a rule of procedure not designed to
modify substantive rights. The class defendants in the instant case were
not personally served nor did they voluntarily appear. Therefore, if the
traditional elements of due process in personal actions are to remain
unaffected, it would appear that the same have not been satisfied in a
suit such as this one.
Professor Moore, working with the Advisory Committee who drafted
the rules in question, sought to obviate uncertainty as to the efficacy of
a judgment in. a suit brought within the framework of Rule 23 by
specifically declaring the several effects thereof. He proposed, under
Rule 23(a) (1), that the judgment should be conclusive against and
binding upon the entire class, but his proposal was rejected by the
committee as amounting to a substantive change in the law.'" The
decision to reject such proposal was sound in the light of the enabling
statute, but even if it had been the opposite way there would still be
occasion to question the worth of such a judgment. As one learned
authority has said, a judgment at law "disconnected from the right to
issue execution, would be so idle and worthless a record that we can
scarcely conceive that its creation would be encouraged, or its existence
tolerated. '19
If the judgment would not impose pecuniary liability on the members
16 National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U. S. 350, 60
S. Ct. 569, 84 L. Ed. 799 (1939).
17 McGehee, Due Process of Law under the Federal Constitution (Edw. Thomp-
son Co., New York, 1906), p. 89.
18 Moore, op. cit., p. 2283 et seq.
19 Freeman, Executions, 3d Ed., Vol. 1, p. 30, § 10.
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of the class, can it then truly be the "helpful step" which the specially
concurring opinion suggests it would be to reach the association's assets?
The judgment being a nullity as to the personal estates of those before
the court merely as a class, it would seem to be a non sequitur to say
that the assets of the association would be subject to execution on such
a judgment, particularly where the association is not suable as an entity.
At most, only so much of the assets as represents the interests of those
personally before the court might be levied upon, and even this is doubtful.
The interests of individuals who compose an unincorporated nonprofit
association are peculiar in the law. It has been said that by becoming a
member a person "ordinarily acquires, not a severable right to any of
its property or funds, but merely a right to the joint use and enjoyment
thereof so long as he continues to be a member." '2 0 Since the right of
any individual is not severable, it is probably immune from execution
although, comparable to the share of a partner, it might be subjected
to equitable processes.21
Difficulties would likewise arise if the judgment were to be employed
as the basis of a suit in attachment to reach funds in the hands of the
association. 22 The tort claim has been reduced to a liquidated obligation
only as to those members of the class personally under the court's
jurisdiction. So far as the rest of the membership is concerned, the
plaintiff has only a professed right to sue them in- tort, a claim which
would hardly support an attachment against their interests. The class
judgment, then, would settle few problems as to pecuniary liability:
Would such a judgment serve to minimize future proof by fore-
closing all questions except those relating to participation, authorization,
or ratification by other members of the class when the latter are sued
in separate actions? Here again-, there is uncertainty of success. The
orthodox view has been that a judgment in a law action is res judicata
only as to the immediate parties and their privies. 23 The judgment being
inadequate to impose pecuniary liability, it is difficult to see how other
members, subsequently sued, would be estopped to deny .facts established
in the representative suit on any accepted theory of privity.24 The almost
inescapable conclusion, then, is that any judgment which might be
20 7 C. J. S., Associations, § 27.
21 See Sec. 28 of the Uniform Partnership Act; 7 Unif. Laws Anno. 162.
22 4 Am. Jur., Attachment and Garnishment, § 374; Waples, A Treatise on Attach-
ment and Garnishment (Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1895), § 250; Wade, A Treatise
on Attachment and Garnishment (Bancroft-Whitney Co., San Francisco, 1887), § 36,
note 6.
23 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, § 178.
24 Freeman, Judgments, 5th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 959, § 438.
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rendered in favor of the plaintiff would be worthless for all practical
purposes, except as it might be used against those defendants over whom
jurisdiction was established without the aid of the class suit device.
It must, in candor, be admitted that none of the questions posed
by the instant case is amenable to a conclusive answer at this stage of
the development of the rule. The very novelty thereof causes any proffered
solution to be no more than speculation. But it is doubtful if the matter
should be left to be worked out, as was suggested by the court, through
a "case by case demonstration of what [it] is possible for the rule to
do in actual practice. 25 So many fundamentals of substantive principle
are involved that nothing short of congressional action will serve. One
commentator has suggested a revision which would make notice to all
the members of the class a condition precedent to a class action, leaving
the mechanics of the notice to be left to the discretion of the court
concerned.26 Such a revision, if authorized by statute, would amount
to a declaration of what should be deemed due process in class actions
in personam and might serve to bind all members of the case whether
they elected to file an appearance or not. If the judgment then pronounced
were also declared to be conclusive only as to facts actually litigated
and established, the possibility of individual injustice, as where there
was a failure by those representing the class to raise a meritorious
personal defence, would be prevented. Without implementation by such
a revision, the present rule might as well be. returned to its original
service in connection, with truly equitable matters for it is not yet a
mechanism fully adapted for use with all civil actions.
D. C. AHERN
TORS--INVASION OF PERSONAL SAFETY, COMFORT OR PRIVACY-
WHETHER PUBLICATION OF PHOTOGRAPH WITHOUT PERMISSION CONSTITUTES
VIOLATION OP RIGHT OF PRIVACY-TwO recent federal cases, one arising
in the District of Columbia and the other in Minnesota, renew interest
in the question of the existence of a right of privacy. In the first of
them, that of Peavy v. Curtis Publishing Company,' the District Court
for the District of Columbia had to rule on a case involving the un-
authorized publication of plaintiff's photograph in conjunction with a
satirical article appearing in a national magazine concerning taxicab
drivers in the nation's capital where plaintiff was a woman taxicab driver.
25 168 F. (2d) 182 at 189.
26 See an unsigned note entitled "Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Reform of
Rule 23," in 46 Col. L. Rev. 818 (1946), particularly pp. 834-5.
178 F. Supp. 305 (1948).
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The complaint contained two counts, one for libel and the other for
damages flowing from the invasion of a claimed right of privacy.
Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for insufficiency was readily
overruled as to the libel count but, because the question of the existence
of a right of privacy was an open one in the District,2 the court went
to some length to establish that such a right did exist. In reaching that
decision, the court, at least by implication, joined the bolder or, as
described by some, the more enlightened courts3 which recognize a legal
right of privacy independent of some property right, or implied contract,
or breach of trust, a right which has been roughly described as the right
to be let alone. The court stated that it is "time that fictions be abandoned
and the real character of the injury be frankly avowed. "4 The second
case, that of Berg v. The Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company,5 was
brought for an alleged wrongful publication of a news photograph taken
of plaintiff during a recess in a court hearing between plaintiff and his
wife over the custody of their children. It was alleged that plaintiff's
right of privacy had been invaded to his humiliation and distress. The
court there, however, denied recovery, quoting from the celebrated article
on the subject by Warren and Brandeis to the effect that the "right of
privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public
interest."6 Although recovery was denied, it is of interest to note that
the court did not discuss the necessity of finding one of the usual bases
for the right of privacy but seemed to assume its independent existence.
A reading of the decisions dealing with the subject leaves an im-
pression of substantial lack of uniformity in the reasoning employed to
2 But see Peed v. Washington Times Co., 55 Wash. L. Rep. 182 (1927), decided by
the Supreme Court for the District of Columbia, wherein the defendant newspaper
published a picture that had been stolen from plaintiff. A demurrer to a complaint
predicated on an invasion of the right of privacy was overruled.
3 Feinberg, "Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy," 48 Col. L. Rev. 713
(1948), discusses the growth of the law of privacy and notes a trend to recognize
the existence of a right of privacy independent of either a property right, a
contractual or a confidential relationship. See also Restatement, Torts, Vol. 4,
§ 867 and annotation in 138 A. L. R. 22.
4 78 F. Supp. 305 at 308.
5 79 F. Supp. 957 (1948).
6 Warren and Brandeis, "The Right of Privacy," 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 at 214
(1890). It was not until the publication of this article that the right of privacy
was introduced and defined as an independent right and the distinctive principles
upon which it was based were formulated. The Supreme Court of Georgia, in
Pavesich v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190 at 193, 50 S. E. 68 at
69 (1905), noted that, prior to 1890, "every case in this country and in England
which might be said to have involved a right of privacy was not based upon the
existence of such right, but was founded upon a supposed right of property, or
breach of trust, or confidence, or the like, and that therefore a claim independent
of a property or contractual right or some right of a similar nature had, up to
that time, never been recognized in terms of any decision."
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support the right of privacy. Some recognize its existence only when
property is involved, a contractual relationship can be implied, or when
a relationship of trust can be established. A second group place recog-
nition on a constitutional basis. Others say an independent legal right
of privacy exists and seek no further for its support.
Indicative of the first view are decisions from England where the
courts have long been hampered by the unfortunate dictum, pronounced
by Lord Eldon in Gee v. Pritchard7 to the effect that equity acts to
protect only property rights. In Prince Albert v. Strange,8 for example,
it was declared that the defendant could not be restrained from perform-
ing the acts he was doing simply on the ground that plaintiff's feelings
would be injured thereby so long as no property right was being invaded.
Still later, in Pollard v. Photographic Company,9 the court had to search
for an implied contract before it could say that defendant's conduct
amounted to an actionable breach. Much the same sort of reasoning was
relied upon in the early New York case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Company.10 There the court adverted to the fact that the law is
not designed to remedy all evils so that if a right of privacy was to exist
it would be a legislative function to create one.1 But such uncritical
reliance on dictum has been condemned both by writers 2 and courts"
7 2 Swanst. 402 at 413, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 at 674 (1818).
8 2 DeG. & S. 652, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1848).
9 40 Ch. Div. 345 (1888).
10 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442, 59 L. R. A. 478 (1902).
11 The New York legislature was not slow to follow the hint. The present statute
may be found in Cahill, Cons. Laws New York 1930, Civil Rights Law, Art 5, § 51.
12 Pound, "Equitable Relief against Defamation and Injuries to Personality,"
29 Harv. L. Rev. 640 (1916); Chafee, "The Progress of the Law-1919-1920,"
34 Harv. L. Rev. 388 (1921); Long, "Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal
Rights," 33 Yale L. J. 115 (1923) ; W. B. G., "A Re-interpretation of Gee v.
Pritchard," 25 Mich. L. Rev. 889 (1927); Walsh, "Equitable Protection of Personal
Rights," 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. 878 (1930); Leflar, "Equitable Prevention of Public
Wrongs," 14 Tex. L. Rev. 427 (1936) ; Bennett, "Injunctive Protection of Personal
Interests-A Factual Approach," 1 La. L. Rev. 665 (1939) ; Oberfell, "Jurisdiction
of Equity to Protect Personal Rights," 20 Notre Dame Law. 56 (1944). Case com-
ments on the decision in Reed v. Carter, 268 Ky. 1, 103 S. W. (2d) 663 (1937), to
be found in 51 Harv. L. Rev. 166 and 13 Ind. L. J. 416, are to the same effect, the
latter one referring to the adherence to the dicta of Lord Eldon as "unintelligent."
But see Simpson, "Fifty Years of American Equity," 50 Harv. L. Rev. 171 at 222
(1936), who states: "May not the repeated judicial statements that equity protects
only rights of property involve something more than the uncritical acceptance of
an old dictum of Lord Eldon? May not these statements be predicated on a deeper
wisdom in the actual administration of justice through fallible human instruments
than are the logically sound and humanly appealing arguments of modern legal
scholarship?"
13 See, for example, Henley v. Rockett, 243 Ala. 172, 8 So. (2d) 852 (1942)
Stark v. Hamilton, 149 Ga. 227, 99 So. 861, 5 A. L. R. 1041 (1919) ; Foley v. Ham,
102 Kan. 66, 169 P. 183, L. R. A. 1918C 204 (1917) ; Reed v. Carter, 268 Ky. 1, 103
S. W. (2d) 663 (1937) ; Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 117 La. 708, 42 So. 228, 116 Am.
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who have attacked the fundamental premise, still followed by some
tribunals, 14 that preventative relief is not available to secure interests
in personality where no property right is concerned."
Only two states have turned to constitutional provisions to find
support for the right of privacy. The Missouri case of Barber v. Time,
Incorporated6 rests squarely on a provision in the bill of rights to the
state constitution to the effect that all men have inalienable rights to life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness ;17 thereby obviating an earlier case
which had striven to find a property right in a picture as justification
for recovery. 1 8 The California case of Melvin v. Reed,"9 on the other
hand, used two premises to support recovery, one founded on a similar
constitutional guarantee, 2 the other treating the right as an incident to
personality rather than arising from property. The infrequent reference
in the cases to the constitutional right to pursue happiness is the more
noteworthy as it has been passed over in all of the more recent decisions
although the constitutional guarantee has been universally accepted in
this country.
The third and more liberal attitude, recognizing an independent
legal right attaching to every human being, whether property owner or
not, is displayed in the decisions from the highest courts of eleven
American jurisdictions2 1 as well as in nisi prius decisions to be found
St. Rep. 215 (1906) ; Ex parte Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 226 S. W. 936, 14 A. L. R. 286
(1920) ; Hawkes v. Yancey, 265 S. W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App., 1924). Not all of these
cases are "privacy" cases but all are critical of the so-called "property" concept
of equity jurisdiction.
14 The insistence on "property" right is evident in the following cases: In re
Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 8 S. Ct. 482, 31 L. Ed. 402 (1888) ; Smith v. Ham, 207 Ark.
507, 181 S. W. (2d) 475 (1944); Blanton v. Blanton, 163 Ga. 361, 136 So. 14-1
(1926) ; People v. Prouty, 262 Ill. 218, 104 N. E. 387, Ann. Cas. 1915B 155 (1914) ;
White v. Pasfield, 212 Ill. App. 73 (1918) ; Chappell v. Stewart, 83 Md. 323, 33 A.
542, 37 L. R. A. 783, 51 Am. St. Rep. 476 (1896).
15 In Kenyon v. City of Chicoppee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N. E. (2d) 241 (1946), the
court pronounced Lord Eldon's dictum to be a "sweeping generalization" unsup-
ported by any convincing reasons.
16 34g Mo. 1191, 159 S. W. (2d) 291 (1942).
17 Mo. Const. 1875, Art. II, § 4.
18 In Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911), the defendant
had demurred on the ground that the invasion of the right of privacy was not
actionable unless accompanied by some injury to property or interference therewith.
The court observed that plaintiff had an exclusive right to his picture on the score
of it being a property right of "material profit."
19 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
20 Cal. Const. 1879, Art. I, § 1.
21 Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P. (2d) 133 (1945) ; Cason
v. Baskin, 159 Fla. 31, 30 (2d) 635 (194,7), and the companion case of Cason v.
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in Ohio 22 and Pennsylvania. 23 In each instance, fictional bases for recovery
have been repudiated and no reference has been made to any constitutional
guarantee. An actionable invasion has been said to occur in those states
whenever there has been an "unwarranted appropriation or exploitation
of one's personality, the publicizing of one's private affairs with which
the public has no legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's
private activities, in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffer-
ing, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities. "24 The
weight of authority, to say the least, is favorable to that view.
Whether courts of appellate rank in Illinois would recognize a right
of privacy remains to be seen. Should they desire to do so, they now have
the advantage of a substantial body of precedent on which to rely. They
could summon to their aid the same type of constitutional provision
utilized in other states.25 They could conjure up property rights where
none in fact exist. They might imply contracts in areas where the law
of quasi-contracts would fear to trespass. They could, if they feared
historical prejudices limiting common law writs, find a relationship of
trust without a corpus, to meet the doctrine that equity acts only to
protect property rights. They might insist that the problem is one for
legislative cognizance only. But if they would stand with the growing
majority, they would fearlessly proclaim that privacy is as natural a
human right as is that of bodily security.
W. H. BREWSTEM
Baskin, 155 Fla. 307, 20 So. (2d) 243 (1944); Pavesich v. New England Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68, 69 L. I. A. 101 (1905) ; Patton v. Jacobs,
- Ind. -, 78 N. E. (2d) 789 (1948) ; State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364,
66 N. E. (2d) 755 (1946), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvIEw 166; Kunz v.
Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532, L. R. A. 1918D 1151 (1918) ; Maysville Transit Co.
v. Ort, 296 Ky. 524, 177 S. W. (2d) 369 (1944) ; Dean v. Kirby Lumber Co., 162 La.
671, 111 So. 55, 52 A. L. R. 1023 (1927) ; Frey v. Dixon, 141 N. J. Eq. 481, 58 A. (2d)
86 (1948); McGovern v. Van Riper, 140 N. J. Eq. 341, 54 A. (2d) 469 (1946);
Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E. 55 (1938) ; Hinish v. Meyer
& Frank Co., Inc., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P. (2d) 438, 138 A. L. R. 1 (1941) ; Holloman
v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 192 S. C. 454, 7 S. E. (2d) 169, 127 A. L. R. 110 (1940).
22 Freedman v. Cincinnati Local Joint Ex. Board, 20 Ohio Op. 473 (1941). There
is dictum to the same effect in Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio Op. 338 (1938).
23 Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (1940) ; Harlow v. Buno Co., 36 Pa.
D. & C. 101 (1939). But see the earlier case of Owen v. Hinman, 1 Watts & S.
548 (Pa., 1841), wherein the court denied recovery because the plaintiff had no
property that was being injured. The concurring opinion of Justice Maxey, In
Waring v. W. D. A. S. Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937), Is
often cited as recognizing an independent right of privacy.
24 41 Am. Jur., Privacy, § 2.
25 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 19.
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WILLS-REQUISITES AND VALIDITY-WHETHER OR NOT CANCELLATION
OF ONE OF Two DUPLICATE ORIGINAL WILLS OPERATES TO REVOKE OTHER
DUPLICATE ORIGINAL LEFT IN CUSTODY OF ANOTHER PERSON-The Illinois
Supreme Court recently had occasion to determine a novel question in the
law of wills when it reviewed the lower court holding in the case of
In re Holmberg's Estate.1  The decedent there concerned had executed
a typewritten original of her will as well as a copy, the copy being a
carbon impression of the original instrument. Both were executed in
conformity with statutory requirements. 2 The decedent delivered the
original to a friend for safekeeping but retained the executed carbon
copy. Upon decedent's death, the friend filed the original instrument
in the probate court and the person named to act as executrix filed a
petition for probate. A few days later, the carbon copy was found in
decedent's home and it, too, was filed. The carbon copy, however, had
the word "void" written diagonally down the length of the first page
so as to extend across each paragraph appearing thereon. The word
"void," with the decedent's signature above and below it, was also
written in large letters on the second page above the original attesting
signatures. It was conceded that the superimposed writings were in the
handwriting of the testatrix, and that the carbon impression also bore
the legend "Copy." The Probate and Circuit Court, upon finding that
both the original and the duplicate copy of the will and the inscriptions
written thereon were executed by the decedent, declared the words so
written on the carbon copy were effective to revoke the original instru-
ment and therefore denied probate of the purported will. The proponents
appealed from this order, thereby projecting the question as to whether
an otherwise effective revocation of a will3 is to be deemed nullified by
the continued existence, in the possession of another, of a duplicate
original bearing no mark or evidence of revocation. That question was
answered, for the first time in this state, when the Supreme Court,
affirming the decision below, held that the cancellation of one of two
duplicate originals operated to revoke the other will also.
Because of the novelty of the issue in Illinois,4 the court turned for
1400 Ill. 366, 81 N. E. (2d) 188 (1948).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3, § 194.
3 The court decided that the defacement appearing on the duplicate copy would
have been sufficient to cause a revocation if it had been placed on a single instru-
ment executed by the testator.
4 A more complete discussion of other aspects concerning revocation and revival
of wills, but exclusive of the question involved herein, may be found in Zacharias
and Maschinot, "Revocation and Revival of Wills," 25 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REvIEw
at pp. 185-215, 271-323, and in Vol. 26, pp. 107-55.
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support to those states that had previously had occasion to decide the
question and had reached the conclusion that the revocation of a duplicate
executed copy of a will might serve to revoke the original5 but that
the destruction 6 or loss 7 of the duplicate original merely raises a pre.
sumption of revocation which is rebuttable and, therefore, becomes
a fact issue.8 In the case of In re Martin's Wil,9 for example, the
testator executed duplicate copies of his will but destroyed the original
which had been retained in his possession. Evidence introduced in the
proceeding to probate the duplicate copy tended to show that the testator
had destroyed the instrument in his possession because it was marred
by ink spots. The court, admitting the copy to probate, said that the
mere failure to produce the original of the testator's will did not serve
to bar admission to probate of the carbon copy.
But the rule remains that when the testator can be shown to have
had in his possession an executed copy of his will, and subsequently this
copy is either found destroyed or cancelled or cannot be found at all,
the presumption arises that the copy was destroyed animo revocandi.10
For this purpose, it makes little difference whether it is the original or
the duplicate impression that has become lost, destroyed or cancelled.
Thus, in the case of In re Wall's Will" the testator kept the carbon
5 In re Walshe's Estate, 196 Mich. 42, 163 N. W. 70 (1917) ; Manangle v. Parker,
75 N. H. 139, 71 A. 637 (1908) ; In re Lawrence's Will, 138 N. J. Eq. 134, 47 A.
(2d) 322 (1946) ; Crossman v. Crossman, 95 N. Y. 145 (1884) ; In re Wall's Will,
223 N. C. 591, 27 S. E. (2d) 728 (1943) ; In re Estate of Bates, 286 Pa. St. 58,3,
134 A. 513 (1926) ; Combs v. Howard, 131 S. W. (2d) 206 (Tex. Civ. App., 1939);
In re Wehr's Will, 247 Wis. 98, 18 N. W. (2d) 709 (1945).
6 Manangle v. Parker, 75 N. H. 139, 71 A. 637 (1908) ; In re Moore's Estate, 137
Misc. 522, 244 N. Y. S. 612 (1930).
7In re Walshe's Estate, 196 Mich. 42, 163 N. W. 70 (1917) ; In re Breding's
Estate, 161 Misc. 322, 291 N. Y. S. 750 (1936) ; In re Andriola's Will, 160 Misc.
775, 290 N. Y. S. 671 (1936).
8 Combs v. Howard, 131 S. W. (2d) 206 (Tex. Civ. App., 1939).
940 N. Y. S. (2d) 685 (1943).
10 Snider v. Burke, 84 Ala. 53, 4 So. 225 (1888) ; Stuart v. McWhorten, 238 Ky.
82, 36 S. W. (2d) 842 (1939) ; In re Walshe's Estate, 196 Mich. 42, 163 N. W. 70
(1912) ; Manangle v. Parker, 75 N. H. 139, 71 A. 637 (1908) ; In re Lawrence's
Will, 138 N. J. Eq. 134, 47 A. (2d) 322 (1946) ; In re Beaney's Estate, 62 N. Y. S.
(2d) 341 (1946) ; In re Flynn's Estate, 174 Misc. 565, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 571 (1940) ;
In re Robinson's Will, 168 Misc. 545, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 671 (1938) ; In re Breding's
Estate, 161 Misc. 322, 291 N. Y. S. 750 (1936) ; In re Andriola's Will, 160 Misc.
775. 290 N. Y. S. 671 (1936) ; In re Moore's Estate, 137 Misc. 522, 24'4 N. Y. S. 612
(1930) ; In re Vogelsang's Will, 133 Misc. 395 (1928) ; In re Field's Will, 109
Misc. 409, 178 N. Y. S. 778 (1919) ; In re Schofield's Will, 129 N. Y. S. 190 (1911) ;
Crossman v. Crossman, 95 N. Y. 145 (1884) ; In re Wall's Will, 223 N. C. 591, 27
S. E. (2d) 728 (1943) ; In re Dawson's Estate, 277 Pa. St. 168, 120 A. 828 (1923) ;
Combs v. Howard, 131 S. W. (2d) 206 (Tex. Civ. App., 1939) ; In re Wehr's Will,
247 Wis. 98, 18 N. W. (2d) 709 (1945).
11223 N. C. 591, 27 S. E. (2d) 728 (1943). Accord: In re Robinson's Will, 257
App. Div. 405, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 324 (1939).
176 CHIOAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
copy and gave the original to the scrivener of the will. When the original
was filed for probate and it was found that the carbon copy was un-
accountably missing, the court held this was sufficient to raise the
presumption of revocation and, absent evidence to the contrary, the
instrument was revoked. Conversely, in the case of In re Field's Will,
1 2
the testator had kept possession of the original instrument and its un-
explained absence at death served to effect a revocation of the duplicate.
For that matter, the one-time existence of a number of executed
copies of the will has not served to* influence the court into modifying
this position. Thus, in the case of In re Moore's Estate,13 the unexplained
absence of the original copy of the testator's will, kept in his possession,
was deemed sufficient to nullify two other duplicate originals left in the
possession of others. The holding in In re Andriola's Wilt1 4 would like-
wise indicate that all copies of the will, whether in duplicate or multipli-
cate, are to be looked upon as collectively one will and, while only one
will is admitted to probate, all copies must be presented to the court
for the duplicate or multiplicate copy is the alter ego of the original.
The destruction or loss of a conformed copy of a will, on the other
hand, does not raise the presumption of revocation 5 any more than should
the destruction or loss of an unsigned copy.16
It has been said that the strength of the presumption that arises
when the testator is known to have destroyed one copy of a will which
has been executed in duplicate depends upon the fact situation. If he
destroyed the only copy in his possession, the presumption of an intent
to revoke would be strong. If he was possessed of both copies and
destroyed but one, it would be weaker. If he altered one and then
destroyed it, retaining the other entire, the presumption has been said
to still hold although even more faintly. 17  In Roberts v. Roberts, 8
however, the testator first altered and then destroyed one copy of his
will, both then being in his possession. The court held that, since the
testator had both copies in his possession and could have revoked or
12 109 Misc. 409, 178 N. Y. S. 778 (1919). Accord: In re Estate of Bates, 286 Pa.
St. 583, 134 A. 513 (1926).
13 137 Misc. 522, 244 N. Y. S. 612 (1930).
14 160 Misc. 775, 290 N. Y. S. 671 (1936). See also In re Flynn's Estate, 174
Misc. 565, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 571 (1940).
15 In re Wehr's Will, 247 Wis. 98, 18 N. W. (2d) 709 (1945).
16 Search reveals no case actually involving this point but that result would
seem to be dictated by principle. As the unsigned copy is not a "will" for lack of
execution, its destruction could hardly amount to a nullification of something it
does not purport to be.
17 Greenleaf, Evidence, Vol. 2, § 681.
183 Hagg. Eccl. 548, 162 Eng. Rep. 1258 (1830).
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destroyed both, the fact that he allowed one to stand was evidence of
his intent to acknowledge the remaining copy as his will.
Upon precedent and principle, then, it appears that the instant case
has been correctly decided. It may, however, be pertinent to observe
that the questionable practice of executing duplicate wills might con-
ceivably lead to results quite unintended by the testator. The design
of such an individual is to achieve greater security thereby. In the event
one copy is lost, he has another with which to replace it. But a testator
who is ignorant of the legal effect to be given to the unexplained absence
of a duplicate executed will which has been kept in his possession achieves
not security but a result that may well be the opposite of his intended
testamentary disposition. These possible results are not beyond the realm
of probability; in fact, so possible do they become, that the careful
attorney would do well to advise his client of the pitfalls that exist in
executing duplicate wills. The suggestion is not made as a criticism of
the principle of law involved nor of the presumption based thereon, for
it is far more logical to presume that the testator intended to cause a
revocation of his will when he destroys the only copy in his possession,
or that he did destroy such copy with intent to revoke when its dis-
appearance is unexplained by any act or word of his, than to believe
the contrary. What is designed is a caution to the unwary testator
to have greater respect for an executed duplicate copy of his will.
H. SILVERSTEIN
RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS.*
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS-WHETHER
STATE ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS VIOLATES FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT-State enforcement of a restrictive covenant designed to
exclude Negroes from occupying a specified area on the south side of
Chicago was sought in the case of Tovey v. Levy.1 Injunction was
granted by the trial court on the ground that the restrictive agreement,
voluntarily entered into between the several property owners, in no way
violated state or federal constitutional provisions. 2 On direct appeal to
the Illinois Supreme Court because of the constitutional issues concerned,3
that court, deeming itself bound by the recent holding of the United
States Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer,4 reversed on the ground that
judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants amounts to prohibited state
action under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found no vice in
restrictive agreements themselves, nor regarded them open to objection
if voluntarily adhered to. The question still remains open, then, as to
whether a suit for damages for violation of such an agreement may yet
serve to provide some legally coercive backing for their recognition.
CORPORATIONS-DISSOLUTION-WHETHER INSTITUTION OF STATUTORY
PROCEEDING TO HAVE VALUE OF SHARES FIXED PREVENTS DISSENTING
SHAREHOLDERS FROM MAINTAINING ACTION IN EQUITY ON CLAIM OF
FRAuD--The Appellate Court for the Third District recently had oc-
casion, in the case of Opelka v. Quincy Memorial Bridge Company," to
deal with the possibility of an election of remedies in a proceeding by
minority shareholders to obtain relief against the corporation for a
fraudulent sale of its assets. In that case, the stock held by plaintiffs
was preferred as to assets to the extent of its par value, and cumulatively
preferred as to dividends, there being substantial accrued unpaid
dividends. The assets of the defendant corporation were purchased by
the City of Quincy, pursuant to a reservation of power to recapture the
franchise, which had originally been given to the city, on condition that
* Editorial note: A new section has been added to the CHCAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
In which recent Illinois cases, not considered worthy of a more extended treat-
ment, are noted for the particular benefit of the Illinois lawyer as these cases
appear to possess some novelty or significance to the law of this state.
1401 II. 393, 82 N. E. (2d) 441 (1948).
2 The validity of such a covenant had been tested in the earlier case of Burke
v. Kleiman, 277 I1. App. 519 (1934), and had there been upheld. That decision,
not referred to in the instant case, must now, be regarded as overruled.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 199.
4 334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948).
1 335 111. App. 402, 82 N. E. (2d) 184 (1948).
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the city apply the purchase money first to the retirement of the bonds,
second to the preferred stock, and last to the common stock of the
corporation. The plaintiffs claimed that the common stockholders were
paid while they had been given nothing for their preferred. They alleged
that there was a fund on deposit in the name of the corporation which
could be used to pay their claims, but that the defendant corporation
refused to do so. The question of election of remedies was brought about
by the fact that plaintiffs, in order to prevent themselves from being
legally presumed to have assented to the sale, had filed a statutory action
under Section 73 of the Business Corporation Act,2 although they much
preferred the equitable relief sought in the present action.' The
Appellate Court held that, in cases involving fraud and illegality,4 the
remedy provided by Section 73 was not exclusive. The decision, first of
its kind in Illinois, not only recognizes the need for more flexible relief
than that provided by the statute but also eliminates the difficulty which
previously arose from a failure to file an appropriate statutory action in
sufficient time to prevent the operation of the automatic presumption
of approval of the sale,s at least in cases where fraud can be shown.
INJUNCTION-SUBJECTS OF PROTECTION AND RELIEF-WHETHER
INJUNCTION MAY BE OBTAINED TO PREVENT SUCCESSIVE BREACHES OF AN
INSTALLMENT CONTRACT-The plaintiff in the case of Serafin v. Reid'
filed a bill in equity to enjoin defendant from breaching a written
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 157.73. The material provisions of that statute
Indicate that In the event of a sale of all of the property or assets of a corporation,
otherwise than in the usual and regular course of its business, "any shareholder
who shall not have voted in favor thereof, may, within twenty days after the
vote was taken, make written demand on the corporation for the payment to him
of the fair value of his shares." The statute further directs that, in the event no
agreement can be reached as to the worth of the shares, a suit is to be filed to
determine the value thereof. That suit must be filed within a limited period of
time or else, for failure to sue, the shareholder "shall be conclusively presumed to
have approved and ratified the sale or exchange and shall be bound by the terms
thereof." The motion to dismiss the instant case, granted by the trial court, urged
that proceedings based on the statutory provision aforesaid had been providently
instituted.
3 Plaintiffs asked that the fund on deposit and all other funds and property of
the corporation be impressed with a trust for their benefit.
4 The case was not heard on the merits. As the ruling had been made on a
motion to dismiss, plaintiff's allegations of fraud were regarded as true for the
purpose of ruling on the motion to dismiss.
5 In Morris v. Columbia Apartments Corporation, 323 Ill. App. 292, 55 N. E. (2d)
401 (1944), the plaintiff did not proceed under Section 73 of the Business Cor-
poration Act within the time specified but elected to maintain an action independent
thereof. The court held that the statute created a conclusive presumption of
approval of the sale which operated to preclude plaintiff in the action he did bring.
It is difficult to see how, in a case in which only equitable relief would be adequate,
a plaintiff shareholder could obtain that relief In the absence of a ruling such as
the one in the instant case.
1335 Ill. App. 512, 82 N. E. (2d) 381 (1948).
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agreement executed by the parties therein under the terms of which the
defendant, in consideration of plaintiff's forbearance to institute bastardy
proceedings, agreed to pay plaintiff a weekly sum for the support and
maintenance of their minor child. Equitable jurisdiction was invoked
on the ground that successive suits at law would be necessary to enforce
plaintiff's rights under the contract and would thereby give rise to an
undesirable multiplicity of suits. After issues were joined on defendant's
claim that the agreement had been obtained by duress, the trial court
entered a decree finding not only that a specific sum was due to plaintiff
but also enjoining the defendant from breaching the contract. On appeal,
the Appellate Court for the First District reversed the decree saying
that an adequate remedy at law could be had since the issues were simple,
a determination of the suit would be res judicata, and there was no
showing that the defendant was insolvent or that he would persist in
refusing to meet his obligations under the contract. That court preferred
that the issue as to validity of the contract be determined according to
law, and by jury trial if requested, rather than under equitable prin-
ciples. The question as to whether equity should take jurisdiction, in
cases where a periodic sum is due under a contract and a refusal by the
defendant to make payments might lead to a number of suits at law,
has been the subject of controversy. 2 In ordinary commercial transactions,
the rule might well be one remitting the parties to available legal
remedies. In the instant case, however, the question was more nearly one
of child support. The court has acknowledged jurisdiction to order
support in divorce and separate maintenance cases.3 Is there not, then,
some propriety in assuming jurisdiction where paternity of a child born
out of wedlock is admitted and the obligation to support is contractually
acknowledged rather than judicially determined? The difference in the
status of the parents should not be controlling.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-LICENSES AND TAXES-WHETHER DEGREE
OF PROXIMITY OF LICENSED PREMISES TO PUBLIC BUILDINGS IS TO BE
MEASURED FROM STRUCTURE OR BOUNDARY OF LAND--In the case of Smith
v. Ballas,' arising in the Appellate Court for the Third District, the court
was obliged to construe a provision of the Liquor Control Act which
declares that no license "shall be issued for the sale at retail of any
alcoholic liquor within 100 feet of any church, school, hospital, home for
aged or indigent persons or for veterans, their wives or children or any
2 See, for example, Weininger v. Metropolitan Fire Insurance Co., 359 Ill. 584,
195 N. E. 420 (1935).
3 11. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 14, and Ch. 68, § 26.
1335 I1. App. 418, 82 N. U. (2d) 181 (1948).
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military or naval station.' '2 The petitioner-appellant had applied for a
liquor license to conduct a business in petitioner's building located 101
feet and 1 inch from a high school building proper but only 87 feet
8 inches from the nearest point of the real estate upon which the school
building was located. The local commissioner denied a license, but the
state commission, on review, ordered that a license be granted. The
circuit court directed reinstatement of the decision of the local com-
missioner and, on further appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the
holding denying a license. The point specifically in issue called for
construction of the phrase "within 100 feet of any church, school,
hospital" or the like. A narrow construction would have limited the
application of the statute to cases based on measurements drawn from
actual structures standing on the land. The court preferred to find that
the legislative purpose was to protect children, among others, while
within the confines of the premises where they would be apt to gather
and that this could be accomplished only by keeping taverns beyond a
reasonable area to be measured from the boundary line of the property.
An early English case on statutory interpretation furnishes the best
guide to be followed in similar situations. The court there said that "the
office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall
suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle
inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato
commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to
the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico."'
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION-
WHETHER TIME RUNS FROM Loss IN GAMBLING TRANSACTIONS OR FROM
TIME OF PAYMENT OF Bin'--Actions to recover money lost by gambling
are not often filed. For that reason, there is unusual significance in the
case of Holmes v. Brickey' wherein the person who lost money gamblin-
in a dice game filed a suit based on a statutory provision which permits
the loser to sue within six months with a secondary qui tam action there-
after by any other person.2 The gambling transaction in question occurred
on January 4th but actual payment of the money lost did not take place
until two days later. Suit was instituted by the loser on July 5th next
thereafter, being one day over the six-month period following the gambling
transaction but one day before the end thereof with respect to the pay-
2 11. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 43, § 127.
3 Heydon's Case, 3 Co. 7a at 7b, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 at 638 (1584).
1335 Il. App. 390, 82 N. E. (2d) 200 (1948).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 330.
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ment. The trial court dismissed the suit on motion,3 but that holding
was reversed on appeal when the Appellate Court held, seemingly for the
first time, that no cause of action accrued until the money was paid.4 As
the statute refers to the "losing and paying" of money or "delivering"
of any other valuable thing, the decision appears to be obviously correct.2
NEGLIGENCE--AcTIONS--WHETHER RES IPSA LOQUITuR DOCTRINE AP-
PLIES WHEN INSTRUMENTALITY HAS PASSED FROM DEFENDANT'S CONTROL-
The question as to whether or not a plaintiff may rely on the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur in cases in which the defendant has relinquished control
of the agency causing the harm at the time of the injury was considered in
the recent case of Roper v. Dad's Root Beer Company.' The plaintiff
was injured by the explosion of a bottle containing root beer left standing
on a shelf in a self-service market. The record showed merely that the
defendant's truck driver placed such bottles either into the storeroom or
into a display rack, from which they were taken by store employees to
replenish stock removed by customers from the shelf. No evidence was
presented as to when the bottle in question had been delivered or as to its
subsequent handling. The Appellate Court for the First District held
that res ipsa loquitur applied to carbonated beverages, even if the bottle
was not under the control of the defendant at the time of injury, so long
as the defendant had control at the time of the negligent act causing the
injury. However, the court demanded, as a condition precedent to re-
covery, that the plaintiff show affirmatively the absence of intervening
negligence in the handling of the bottle after it left the control of the
defendant. As the plaintiff had wholly failed to comply with this condi-
tion, judgment for the defendant was affirmed. It would appear that this
is the first time that an Illinois court has formulated such a requirement
for previous applications of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to situations
in which harmful foreign substances were found in bottles have been sus-
tained even though defendants have objected that the injurious instru-
mentality had previously gone out of the control of their agents. 2 Since
3 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 172(f), authorizes the use of such a motion when the cause of
action "did not accrue within the time limited by law for the commencement of an
action or suit thereon."
4 The court referred to the holding in English v. Cannon, 17 Ill. App. 475 (lS85),
wherein it was decided that the delivery of a promissory note was not sufficient
to give rise to a cause of action inasmuch as the maker was under no obligation
to pay the same.
5 Compare with Mrowiec v. Polish Army Veterans Ass'n of America, 73 N. Y. S.
(2d) 361 (1947).
1336 11. App. 91, 82 N. E. (2d) 815 (1948).
2 Paolinelli v. Dainty Food Manufacturers, 322 Ill. App. 586, 54 N. E. (2d) 759
(1944), appeal den. 326 Ill. App. xiv, noted in 23 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 69,
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the courts have thus extended the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it seems
only fair to require in return as a safeguard for the defendant that the
plaintiff be required to show that the injury was not caused by intervening
negligent or wilful acts.' Such a doctrine cannot be considered contrary
to established principles in tort cases and may be regarded simply as an
extension of the requirement that the plaintiff must prove that he was
in the exercise of due care and caution.4
dealt with a bone in certain soup mix; Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 318 Il. App.
305, 47 N. E. (2d) 739 (1943), involved paint in a milk bottle; Rost v. Kee &
Chapell Co., 216 Ill. App. 497 (1920), concerned glass particles in milk. The dissent
objected to application of res ipsa loquitur since defendant did not have control
at the time of the injury. In Duval v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 329 Ill. App. 290,
68 N. E. (2d) 479 (1946), a mouse-in-bottle case, the "defendant, for practical
purposes, had exclusive control of the bottle."
3 Similar requirements were made in Tingey v. E. F. Houghton & Co., 172 P. (2d)
715 (Cal. App., 1946), affirmed in 30 Cal. (2d) 97, 179 P. (2d) 807 (1947) ; Escola
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. (2d) 453, 150 P. (2d) 4'36 (1944)
Hughs v. Miami Coca Cola Bottling Co., 155 Fla. 299, 19 So. (2d) 862 (1944);
Alagood v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 135 S. W. (2d) 1056 (Tex. Civ. App., 1940).
But see contra; Fick v. Pilsener Brewing Co., - Ohio Op. -, 86 N. E. (2d) 616
(1949).
4 Hanson v. Trust Co. of Chicago, 380 Ill. 194, 43 N. U. (2d) 931 (1942) ; Dee v.
City of Peru, 343 Ill. 36, 174 N. E. 901 (1931); Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Oswald,
338 Ill. 270, 170 N. E. 247 (1930); West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Liderman, 187 Ill.
463, 58 N. E. 367, 52 L. R. A. 655, 79 Am. St. Rep. 226 (1900) ; Aurora Branch
R. R. Co. v. Grimes, 13 Ill. 585 (1852).
BOOK REVIEWS.
REAL ESTATE TITLES IN ILLINOIS. Logan D. Fitch. Chicago: Callaghan
& Company, 1,948. Pp. xxiv, 804.
One undertaking to examine a real estate title must hold himself
prepared to draw from all the corners of the law as he conducts his
search through the chain of title. As a consequence it is not surprising
to learn that no one has yet written a book which satisfactorily presents
the entire field of title examination. The author of this work, however,
states his purpose to be (1) to cover as fully as possible, in one fair-sized
volume, the law relating to real estate titles (2) in a way that should
be useful not only as a practical reference for lawyers familiar with real
estate law but also as a guide for those who have less experience with
such matters. By these two statements, one concerning what he will write
and the other concerning how he will write it, the author has fairly indi-
cated, as well as anyone could, the direction from which criticisms of
his book might come.
As to the first, any attempt to list all the topics included would be
impractical. Suffice it to say that the index of this volume alone favorably
reflects the author's more than twenty years of service as a lawyer in
the title business and the purposeful thoroughness of his workmanship.
Only two shortcomings might be cited. First, the book fails to include
any treatment of the use of the power of eminent domain or of condem-
nation proceedings based upon that power. This omission, in the face of
the present interest in public housing and municipal development, might
be regretted by some. The other lies in the lack of any systematic treat-
ment of estates in land, whether present or future. What little that is
said about such matters is only incidental to the discussion of the state
of the law governing conveyances, mortgages, wills and liens. Although
the author has privately expressed to this reviewer his dissatisfaction at
stopping without more future interest material, the compromise was
necessitated by considerations of space. With these two exceptions, there
seems to be no aspect of Illinois law relating to real estate titles that is
not stated, explained and documented with appropriate citation to statute
or case.
On the other score, the author has always kept in mind the title
examiner's point of view while developing the material for the book. Take
the chapter on mortgage foreclosures as an example. One without experi-
ence in following a title through foreclosure proceedings will find that the
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author has so grouped his topics that one can immediately grasp the outline
of those aspects of the proceedings which will affect the title and can draw
up therefrom a list of the steps to be considered in ascertaining the ulti-
mate sufficiency of the proceedings. On the other hand, examiners with
more experience will find that within the subdivisions of this topic the
author explains in detail such mysteries as when the owners of paid notes
should be joined as parties defendant to the proceedings, or the prefer-
ence in rights of redemption from the foreclosure sale by judgment credi-
tors as opposed to decree creditors. In his effort to make this a practical
book for practical men, the author has, however, avoided the style of a
practitioner's manual or a handbook for real estate men generally.1 The
arrangement of materials has been carefully worked out to reflect the
problems approximately as they would naturally occur to an examiner.
Instruments of transfer or conveyance, for example, are discussed as they
would be read, i. e., from the names of the parties down to the concluding
acknowledgments. Judicial proceedings are described from the initial
pleadings down to the mechanics of the last possible appeal. But in every
case, matters extraneous to the problem of tracing title and determining
marketability are omitted.
The utility of the approach just described may be questioned by some
on the premise that (1) if this is a reference book for Illinois title exam-
iners, and (2) if most of the title examining is nowadays done by title
insurance companies, then (3) it follows that none but title guaranty men
will find the work of interest. Actually nothing could be more wrong for,
although title insurance has in many places replaced the attorney's opinion
as the most convenient evidence of marketable title, the title insurance
companies are by no means the only people who have an interest in know-
ing their way around in this branch of law. Every attorney who deals
with titles, those who procure title insurance for their clients as well as
those who serve as title examiners, can do a better job of protecting the
interests represented if a reference book such as this is available. Knowl-
edge of title law and skill in analyzing the objectionability of matters
affecting titles should not be allowed to become the mysterious and exclu-
sive art of the title guaranty companies. By equipping lawyers to deal
more intelligently with the title insurance companies, the author has done
no inconsiderable service to both groups. Whether he has made the most
of this potential usefulness to the lawyer who ordinarily prefers to leave
the primary responsibility for title examination to a title insurance com-
1 Perhaps this is just as well in view of the able examples of both types of books
that have appeared in the recent past. See, for example, Kratovil, Real Estate
Law (Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1946), and Becker and Savin, Illinois Lawyers
Manual (Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1948).
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pany may be questioned. It is this reviewer's wish that there might have
been included more material explaining the subject of title insurance.
Such matters as the nature of the title insurance contract, the extent of its
coverage, the conditions under which liability thereon may arise and ter-
minate are all interesting to most readers outside the circle of professional
title men. More material on that aspect would greatly enhance the attrac-
tiveness of this already valuable volume.
R. D. NETHERTON.
BUSINESS LIFE INSURANCE AND OTHER Topics. Albert Hirst. Bloomington,
Illinois: State Farm Life Insurance Company, 1949. Pp. xvi, 165.
A business man's death may prove to be of shattering effect so far
as his business and his business associates are concerned; and this to say
nothing of the catastrophic effect that death might well have upon the
family fortune. Through the use of a proper estate plan, upsets conse-
quent upon death can, to some extent, be eliminated. Essentially the prob-
lem is one to provide a reservoir of liquid assets so that the decedent's
liabilities can be met without undue sacrifice to his estate from forced
liquidation. The theme of this book is the role that life insurance can
play in the preparation of an adequate estate plan. If the book be
read and used with discrimination, it could prove to be of considerable
value for it comments on four critical situations apt to affect the business
enterprise. They are (1) compensation of the employer in the event of
the loss of key personnel, (2) providing for the continuity of a solely
owned business, (3) insuring some measure of success for a stock purchase
plan in a closely held corporation, and (4) establishing the continuity of
a partnership after the death of a partner.
The discussion is both stimulating and provocative but here, unfor-
tunately, is coincidently both the bloom and the blight of the work. The
author neither contemplated nor achieved an exhaustive study of all of
the problems he conjures up. The discriminating reader will be stimulated
and will desire to read more before he could feel competent to discuss,
analyze, and suggest solutions for the problems his clients might well
raise. But there is neither bibliography nor incidental citation of sug-
gested reading material.' In other respects the book fails to bear up too
well under scrutiny. Two chapters appear to be almost entirely unre-
I The following articles might have been noted: Becker, "Coordinating Insurance
and the General Estate," 83 Trusts and Estates 33; Haddad, "Disposition of Busi-
ness Interests," 1 Ii. Law Forum 115; Miller, "Taxation: Partnership Business
Insurance," 22 Notre Dame Law. 343; Millett, "Key Man Life Insurance and
Section 102," 1 Jour. Am. Soc. C. L. U. 462; Powers, "Key Roles in Estate Analysis:
Functions of Attorney, Underwriter and Trustman," 83 Trusts and Estates 337;
Rabkin and Johnson, "The Partnership under the Federal Tax Laws," 55 Harv. L.
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lated, being a discussion of employee benefit plans. There is a notice-
able lack of lucidity at this point for the material is little more than a
grouping of excerpts from the routine material likely to be found in the
average insurance brochure. The accompanying forms may be of service
to the lawyer, especially since they are designed simply to illustrate the
discussion. In the hands of laymen, however, they invite disaster.
E. G. ROBBINS.
INTRODUCTION TO INCOME TAXATION, Second Edition. James M. Hender-
son. Rochester, New York: The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Com-
pany, 1949. Pp. x, 536.
A mathematician, dipping his pen in whimsy, can write fantasies in
prose and verse to charm the youthful. A political economist, tired of
authoritative works, can write nonsense in so humorous a vein as to tickle
the ribs of the aged. But both must go beyond the area of their more
serious pursuits to achieve renown. Here is a lawyer-editor who accom-
plishes both fantasy and humor on the one hand and earnest treatise on
the other, all in the course of one book; preparing a blend so fascinating
as to charm while it also serves to instruct. The annual "headache" pro-
duced by the income tax burden here finds an analgesic treatment worth
a hundred times the cost of the prescription.
On the serious side, the reader will find an introduction to a confused
and irrational subject designed to help him understand the law rather
than to provide the guide which leads to all the answers. It provides the
background necessary to help evaluate the more desirable approach to basic
concepts. It casts revealing light on attitudes, displayed by courts and
officials, which ought not be overlooked by one confronted with a maze of
perplexing verbiage provocative of unjust results and shot through with
irrationalities. It sharpens attention to inconsistencies while it bears
heavily on inequalities developed not only between legal theories but also
between persons. It is timely but it is also timeless.
The obverse characteristic of this book, priceless among legal tomes,
lies in its ability to clear the air like a fan turned suddenly on in a smoke-
filled poker room. That simile is not unworthy of the author's own style
for his humorous asides are filled with picturesque and pungent language,
descending at times to the level of slang but more often revealing poetic
'Rev. 909; Waldo, "Life Insurance and Estate Planning," 1 Ill. Law Forum 95.
More extended discussions appear in Polisher, Estate Planning and Estate Tax
Saving (Geo. T. Bisil Co., 1948), 2 vols., Shattuck, An Estate Planner's Handbook
(Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1948) ; Wormser, The Theory and Practice of Estate
Planning (Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1948), 2d Ed.
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imagery of the highest caliber. He can write of the somnolent effects given
by a reading of the Internal Revenue Code, adopt the jargon of the sport-_
ing world, pin-point ridicule until it sticks like a burr, or sharpen a phrae
until the joke stands out like a gleaming diamond. The pun is not ovr-
looked', nor the quip that rests on contrast. 2 The laugh may be provokdd
by broad overstatement, 3 or by the aptness of the simile.4 One is left
impressed by the idea that it would be a shame to deprive the reader of the
fun of finding the laugh come to his own lips. If, however, the reader
would feel chagrin from being observed laughing to himself, he shofuld be
warned to read when alone. The book is "light" reading, but the term is
emphasized for the illumination which the work casts not to reflect
either its weight or its significance.
W. F. ZACHARIAS
WHAT EvERy CORPORATION DIRECTOR SHOULD KNOW. Percival E. Jackson.
New York: The William-Frederick Press, 1949. Pp. xv, 198.
It is doubtful if a single lawyer exists who has not, at some time or
another, been asked to explain the basic concepts governing the work to
be performed by a corporate director and to supply some essential tips as
to what the director may or may not do. If, to answer such a query, the
lawyer feels impelled to furnish a documented opinion, replete with cita-
tions, he would receive no assistance from this little book for it contains
no table of cases, no reference to standard authorities, nor even so much
as a single footnote. But if the query originates from one who seeks only
a general resume of the scope of his present, or contemplated, job as a
director and who preferably wants that resume written in a conversational
and non-technical style, then here is the book to recommend for his
perusal. It is more nearly a handbook for the corporate executive than
it is a text book for the lawyer, but it loses nothing in its effectiveness
from being written without the use of the "ten-dollar" words that fre-
quently mark more technical publications.
W. F. Z~cARLIAs
I The reference, at p. 190, to the bite of the tax "beadle" evokes a curious thought.
Does the author possess feet of clay after all? May unconscious error have
fashioned the pun, when "beetle" was the word intended? C.f., also, "forsee" for
"foresee" at page 347, and "forgo" for "forego" on page 274.
2 Talking of tax deductions, the author, at page 325, writes: "You can take off
an automobile license but not a dog license. The difference, apparently, is that
you run around in one and the dog runs around with the other; ergo, the last one
is on him."
3 See, for example, at page 325, the following: "Congress finally made it clear,
while millions of ordinary taxpayers waited with bated breath, that, in the inter-
ests of simplifying the Revenue Code, a subsidiary of a subsidiary of a domestic
corporation should be eligible" for a credit for foreign taxes paid.
4 C.f., page 368, a "mouse hole angrily plugged with a bale of hay."
